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ABSTRACT 
 
Ethical Perspectives on Mining-Induced Dislocations in Eastern Congo 
 
 
 
It might be unusual to identify the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) as a 
country where expulsions put at flagrant risk thousands of small farmers to make way for 
economic projects or natural resources extraction, as is the case in Brazil, Argentina, Chile, 
India, South Africa, and Zimbabwe. The lack of documentation and data greatly 
contributes to silencing the victims of dislocations in Eastern Congo. This research, 
therefore, voices six critical claims by raising the ethical question: how can Christian 
ethics—in the only African country with the greatest proportion (43.2 million) of baptized 
Catholics—humanize involuntary displacement and resettlement of communities? While 
the “resource curse theory” has revealed the challenges of a country riddled with 
economic constraints, political instability, and mining-induced conflicts, this research 
proposes the “protological ethics of land” as one approach to dislocations in the era of 
extractive industries.  
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GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
 
This research deals with the question: how can ethics humanize involuntary 
displacement and resettlement of communities in making way for natural resources 
extraction? The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), our case study, spans a surface area 
of 2.3 million square kilometers at the heart of Africa, with 80 million inhabitants. It covers 
52% of the African continent’s surface water reserve. As the World Bank reports, “with 80 
million hectares of arable land and over 1,100 minerals and precious metals, the DRC has 
the potential to become one of the richest countries on the African continent and a driver 
of African growth if it can overcome its political instability.”1 These data reflect an 
estimated US$ 24 billion potentially unexploited minerals in the DRC,2 known as a 
“geologic scandal.”  
Geological mapping reveals a high density of minerals in Eastern Congo (North 
and South Kivu) where allegedly 120 armed groups are active, according to Human 
                                                        
1 http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/drc/overview (accessed May 3, 2018). 
2 Among the minerals are: zinc, tungsten, tin, lead, nickel, manganese, silver, iron, diamond and 
“strategic minerals” such as copper, gold, lithium, cobalt and coltan (extracted in the DRC and used in the 
manufacture of telephones, computers, electronic gadgets, and electric cars). This does not include other 
commodities such as oil, uranium, methane gas, etc. Several studies attempt to demonstrate that chronic 
instability in the DRC is dependent on the needs of the global industry. It is believed by the media that 
multinationals fund armed conflicts to freely access raw materials. 
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Rights Watch’s October 2017 Kivu Security Tracker.3 On the national (2018 Mining Law),4 
regional, and international scale, standards have been defined to prevent “conflict 
minerals.” Still, minerals account for more than 80% of the DRC’s exports and half of its 
GDP. 
Moreover, “there are an estimated 10 million people, 16% of DRC’s population, 
who either mine directly or are dependent on artisanal mining for their livelihood.”5 Thus, 
Mazalto, a Canadian expert in the DRC’s mineral resources, questions, “why no standard 
has been set to specify the nature and extent of companies’ involvement in local 
development? In the absence of normative criteria, companies relate selectively to 
populations, with notable differences.”6 
This framework is fitting to address dislocations of communities aimed at making 
way for natural resources extraction in Eastern Congo. While I am concerned with the 
theoretical formulation of mining-induced dislocation, I also look at the literature 
covering involuntary displacement. As Terminski acknowledges, among the 
inexhaustible possibilities which are likely to occur, the social scientists “enumerate four 
causes of involuntary displacements: conflicts, natural disasters, long-term 
environmental changes, and the consequences of economic development.”7  
                                                        
3 https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/October....pdf (accessed November 
26, 2018). 
4 République Démocratique du Congo, Loi n°18/001 modifiant et complétant la Loi n° 007/2002 
du 11 juillet 2002 portant Code minier.  
5 World Bank, “Democratic Republic of Congo Growth with Governance in the Mining Sector,” 
Oil/Gas, Mining and Chemicals Department (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2008), 7. 
6 Marie Mazalto, “La réforme du secteur minier en République Démocratique du Congo: Enjeux 
de gouvernance et perspectives de reconstruction,” Afrique contemporaine 3, 227 (2008), 64. 
7 Bogumil Terminski, “Mining-Induced Displacement and Resettlement: Social Problem and 
Human Rights Issue (A Global Perspective),” http://indr.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/B.-
Terminski-Mining-Induced-Displacement-and-Resettlement.pdf (accessed September 3, 2018), 4-5. 
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Terminski therefore considers mining-induced displacement and resettlement 
(MIDR) as a sub-category of development-induced displacement and resettlement 
(DIDR). I prefer to use interchangeably both concepts of “mining-induced dislocation” 
(MID) and “mining-induced displacement and resettlement” as a situational reality of 
eviction (or expulsion) of communities to make way either for natural resources’ 
extraction or for economic projects mostly developed by the multinationals.   
The scope of this research focuses on mining extraction, that is, “the human 
endeavor to access the natural resources that are not on the surface of the earth,”8 which 
is likely associated with “the forcing of thousands of people to abandon their current 
places of residence.”9 Supporting this position, Amnesty International reported that, 
during 2011-2013 in Luisha City, 80 km away from Lubumbashi (South-East Congo), 
nearly 300 families were expelled from their land when Congo International Mining 
Corporation (CIMCO), a Chinese company, was yielded mining exploitation rights.10  
I therefore devote exclusive attention to mining-induced dislocation because, on a 
wider scale,  
mining-induced displacement constitutes a major social problem and a 
challenge for human rights. As pointed out by Theodore E. Downing only 
in India mining development displaced more than 2.55 million people 
between 1950 and 1990. It is therefore of great importance to conduct its 
profound analysis as well as inspire broad public debate. According to 
the WBED report (published in 1994), the thermal projects including 
                                                        
8 Thomas Resane, “The mining-induced displacement and resettlement: The church as a leaven 
and ecclesiology in context’s response,” HTS Teologiese Studies/ Theological Studies 71 (3), Art. #2967, 8 
pages. http:// dx.doi.org/10.4102/hts. v71i3.2967 (accessed September 3, 2018), 1. 
9 Terminski, “Mining-Induced Displacement and Resettlement: Social Problem and Human Rights 
Issue (A Global Perspective),” 3. 
10 See Amnesty International, “Étude de cas : expulsions forcées à Luisha,” Pertes et profits : 
Exploitation minière et droits humains dans la Katanga, en République Démocratique du Congo (2013), 25. 
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mining were the cause of about 10,3 percent of the development-induced 
displacement caused by World Bank-financed projects (active in 1993).11  
 
Thomas Resane highlights the unethical role of foreign companies, which have a 
larger stake and share minerals with the national government, marginalizing the 
populations where these activities take place. As a consequence, he claims that these 
populations face strenuous socio-economic imbalances.12 The concern about mining-
induced dislocation in the DRC revolves around socially lasting effects leading to family 
disruption, the absence of any legal scheme on companies’ misconduct in the process of 
consultation, dislocation-relocation, and compensation. 
 These reasons provide the basis for my contention that, by declaring all wealth 
above and beneath the land to be state property, the 1966 Bakajika Land Law laid the 
ground for mining-induced dislocations because a kleptocratic state owning ancestral 
lands is likely to sell them to the rich on an unethical basis.  
 The choice of this particular line of research, hence its relevance, is justified by the 
global concern raised by economic projects forcing communities to abandon their land. 
As Terminski reports, “Gold mines in Tarkwa, open-cast copper mines in Papua New 
Guinea, coal mines in Jharkhand (India), lignite mines in Germany, and diamond mines 
in Zimbabwe are just a few examples of activities leading to the displacement of large 
numbers of people worldwide.”13 An intellectual analysis of “physical abandonment of 
                                                        
11 Terminski, “Mining-Induced Displacement and Resettlement: Social Problem and Human 
Rights Issue (A Global Perspective),” 3. 
12 See Thomas Resane, “The mining-induced displacement and resettlement: The church as a 
leaven and ecclesiology in context’s response,” 1.  
13 Terminski, “Mining-Induced Displacement and Resettlement: Social Problem and Human 
Rights Issue (A Global Perspective),” 3. 
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the existing residence…. the loss of access to material resources such as land, pastures, 
forests and clean water as well as intangible resources such as socio-economic ties”14 leads 
to formulate ethical principles on natural resources extraction and to address human 
rights violations.  
 The methodology of this research depends on a critical approach. Critical analysis 
from the sociological, economic, and human rights perspectives contributes to the 
formulation of an ethical and theological reflection.  
To be successful in this approach, I have outlined my results in three chapters. The 
first chapter pictures the socio-political context of the DRC and points out the state’s 
dependency on mineral resources in the postcolonial DRC. As a consequence, natural 
resources have become a curse for local communities (or indigenous people) occupying 
mining exploitable concessions. The second chapter, focusing on conflicts induced by 
involuntary resettlement, suggests that the land tenure framework, which produces 
adverse effects, be improved so as to bring about restorative and restitutive justice for 
smallholders. The last chapter searches for a reliable Christian ethics in the era of 
extractive industries.  
 
  
                                                        
14 Ibid., 1. 
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CHAPTER 1:  
 
ABUNDANT RESOURCE AS THE CURSE OF DISLOCATIONS 
 
 
Introduction 
 
An overview of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) mining resources’ 
mapping reveals portions of the country conceded to mining companies often associated 
with economic predation. As these longstanding mining contracts are still distrusted, one 
may question how they do justice to communities’ development in a country ranked 
among the lowest average achievement in human development, according to the United 
Nations’ Human Development Index (HDI).15  
These features are not exhaustive, but they do provide an overall picture of the 
DRC. At least, they hint at commodities as a booming sector and, therefore, confirm what 
some call the “Dutch disease.” According to Di John, the “Dutch disease” refers to “the 
discovery [in the 1970s] of the North Sea oil and its impact on the industrial structure of 
such economies of the Netherlands [natural gas] and the United Kingdom,” that is, 
“subsequent deindustrialization in output and employment, which took place in these 
two economies following their resource booms.”16 
                                                        
15 See United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Human Development Indices and 
Indicators: 2018 Statistical Update (New York: United Nations Development Programme, 2018), 41. 
16 Jonathan Di John, “Is There Really a Resource Curse? A Critical Survey of Theory and 
Evidence,” Global Governance 17, 2 (Apr.-June 2011), 168-9. 
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In 2010, the Congolese Bishops’ Conference spoke out about the shortfall caused 
by non-transparent exploitation of mineral resources, “which could have been used to 
develop ambitious economic development projects so as to increase national production 
and therefore improve the living conditions of the population. The exploitation of natural 
resources struggles to get rid of the predation economy.”17 
This resource curse—a paradox of abundant natural resources countries which 
tend to achieve poor economic growth, less democracy, and much instability—is morally 
bankrupt as it accommodates a capitalism-oriented vision of the state which disregards 
human dignity. Because the context matters in debating dislocations in the DRC, this 
overview chapter outlines the problem: which theories, paving the way for evictions, are 
compelling to explain dislocations?  
I argue that dislocations are fueled by an unbroken resource curse. The prospect of 
reversing such a curse should consider the catalytic role of extractive industries driving 
dislocations, so as to halt a kleptocratic denial to communities of the capability to hold 
land property.   
 
I. Unbroken Resource Curse 
 
In examining the resource curse, it is worth reviewing briefly the literature on this 
theory. As Kisekka-Ntale puts it, “the concept was empirically analyzed in a number of 
studies starting with Auty and Gelb. These studies established the nexus between 
                                                        
17 Conférence Épiscopale Nationale du Congo (CENCO), “Faudrait-il encore que le sang coule en 
R.D. Congo ?” Message du Comité Permanent Extraordinaire de la CENCO pour la réussite du processus 
électoral (Kinshasa: 24 juin 2010), 5. 
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resource abundance and poor economic performance indicators such as low per capita 
income, low quality of life, and general underdevelopment.”18  
Di John’s approach highlights that, “natural resources, for most poor countries, are 
deemed to be more of a ‘curse’ than a ‘blessing’.”19 Commodity becomes paradoxically a 
curse because “natural resource abundance leads to poor economic performance and 
growth collapse, high levels of corruption and poor governance, and greater political 
violence.”20   
This thought shifts away from the Innis’ 1966 “staple theory,” which claimed that 
the most influential staple sectors in economic development have been minerals,21 due to 
their capacity to overcome traditional resource gaps such as savings, fiscal and foreign 
exchange constraints—because low income countries usually do not produce machinery 
or capital goods.22 From the historical perspective, Di John goes further by claiming that 
resources featured positively on the economic development of the United States, 
Australia, Canada, and Brazil.  
This assumption stems from an apocalyptic view of the post-World War II 
economy: abundant natural resources have made things worse for low income countries, 
since the resource curse revolves around oil or natural resources abundance.23 The 
                                                        
18 Fredrick Kisekka-Ntale, “Contested Power Terrain: The Legislature and Governance of Oil 
Resources in Uganda,” Extractive Industries in Africa: Addressing Conflicts and Integrating Sustaining 
Development, Elias Omondi Opongo, ed. (Nairobi: Paulines Publications Africa, 2018), 84. 
19 Jonathan Di John, “Is There Really a Resource Curse?” 167. 
20 Ibid., 168. 
21 Roger Hayter & Trevor Barnes, “Innis’ Staple Theory, Exports, and Recession: British Columbia, 
1981-86,” Economic Geography 66, 2 (1990), 161. 
22 See Di John, “Is There Really a Resource Curse?” 168. 
23 See ibidem. 
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literature, therefore, outlines the resource curse arguments in three variants: economy, 
governance, and stability.  
 
A. Negative Economic Impact 
 
Focusing on the Dutch disease mechanism, the economic variant of the resource 
curse claims that a natural resource boom renders the manufacturing and agricultural 
sectors uncompetitive, because it boosts the exchange rate, increases the general spending 
in the economy and raises wages, as well as the cost of goods and services.24 This strand 
assumes that, not only does the cost of manufacturing and agricultural products go up, 
but also the imports in these sectors become expensive because of the high exchange rate. 
Thus, the Dutch disease displays the reality that “natural resources abundance is 
associated with very poor economic performances and a higher propensity of the country 
to have its structures experience deep growth collapses at a greater frequency.”25  
The Congolese export structure tends to confirm the resource curse. For six 
consecutive years (2010—2016), as mentioned in the Central Bank of Congo’s (BCC) 
Annual Reports, the exponential role of mining products discloses complete dependency 
of national income on natural resources: 97.0% of export (2009), 98.3% (2010), 98.6% (2011), 
98.7% (2012), 97.7% (2013), 95.5% (2014), 97.5% (2015), and 97.5% (2016).26 These figures 
obviously disclose lack of export diversification—which “could help reduce growth 
                                                        
24 See Jonathan Di John, “Is There Really a Resource Curse?” 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s3BCuiW9rPc (accessed 02.08.2018). 
25 Ibidem. 
26 See Banque Centrale du Congo, Rapport Annuel 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2016. 
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volatility”27—and present the DRC’s economy as minerals-centered as natural resources 
constitute the only reliable source of income.  
The state budget, whose main source of income is mining products, unsurprisingly 
followed the same trend: USD 1,826,493.75 (2009), USD 3,504,687.50 (2010), USD 
4,216,437.50 (2011), USD 4,130,687.50 (2012), USD 6,434,60 (2013), USD 4,655,625 (2014), 
USD 7,586.22 (2015), and USD 4,503,181.25 (2016). The 2014 export slump noticeably 
brought down the state budget, while the export revival the following year had a positive 
impact on the 2015 budget. Perhaps sustainable growth in the DRC is uncertain when the 
economy depends upon commodity windfall with the risk of volatility.   
The collapse of agriculture is the visible consequence of the mineral’s windfall: 
1.8% of export (2009), 1.3% (2010), 1.1% (2011), 1.0% (2012), 1.9% (2013), 4.4% (2014), 2.5% 
(2015), 2.4% (2016). Good performance is noteworthy in 2014 during the mineral slump. 
This brief success declines immediately in 2015 owing to high international commodity 
prices.  
There likely exist few investments in agriculture since minerals overcome the state 
budget’s constraints. Although its large freshwater reserve (3,680,000 km of watershed) 
offers great opportunities for agriculture, the DRC farms only 10% of its 80 million 
hectares of arable land.28 Thus, “the annual growth of agriculture production represents 
                                                        
27 International Monetary Fund (IMF), Democratic Republic of Congo: Selected Issues (Washington, 
DC: International Monetary Fund, 2015), 21. 
28 See Agence Nationale pour la Promotion des Investissements (ANAPI), Investir dans le secteur 
agricole en République Démocratique du Congo: Cahier sectoriel (Kinshasa: ANAPI, 2016), 10. 
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only 2% unlike the 3.2% of population growth.”29 The logic of this structure predicts that 
deindustrialization is the inevitable change that occurs as a result of commodity boom.30 
Besides, the growth collapses mainly occur in Sub-Saharan economies because of 
the absence of policies to deal with commodity booms. Following the logic of the Dutch 
disease, “a natural resource windfall… can lead to a decline in income via a market 
mechanism, notably an appreciation of the real exchange rate.”31 Obviously, “deepening 
this pattern… can impede the development of the manufacturing sector by consuming all 
available financial resources and contributing to real exchange appreciation (the so-called 
Dutch disease).”32  
This danger is permanent while the increasingly value minerals as of 2017—2018 
is occurring. Copper’s value swung from USD 5,824 to USD 7,014.50 per ton, an increase 
of 20.4%. Likewise, cobalt’s value increased from USD 47,523,75 to USD 84,988.96 per ton, 
an increase of 79%. There was a similar swing for gold, from USD 1,231.15 to USD 1,328.53 
per fine troy ounce, an increase of nearly 8%; lastly, a barrel of oil jumped from USD 52.67 
to $65.18, an increase of 23.8%.33 The boom paradoxically brings about an upsetting rise 
in the rate of inflation as well as a decrease of purchasing power. It should, therefore, be 
of concern for the DRC economy to depend greatly upon natural resources.  
                                                        
29 Ibidem. 
30 See Jonathan Di John, “Is There Really a Resource Curse?”, 169. For deindustrialization in the 
DRC, see the rubric “Structure des exportations” in Banque Centrale du Congo, Rapport annuel 2010, 
2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2016.  
31 Fernanda Brollo et al., “The Political Resource Curse,” NBR Working Paper Series 15705 (2010), 1. 
32 Andrea Goldstein, Nicolas Pinaud & Helmut Reisen, “The Rise of China and India: What’s in it 
for Africa?” Policy Insights 19 (May 2006), 2. 
33 See RDC, Compte-rendu de la 9ème réunion extraordinaire du Conseil des Ministres (Kinshasa: 20 
mars 2018), 6. The figures are mentioned in the report as of March 20, 2018. 
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My sense is that the nonpayment of taxes prevailing in the DRC is also a 
consequence of the Dutch disease, owing to a commodity’s ability to overcome fiscal 
constraints. Still, the Tax Authority evokes an upward trend in tax collection since 2003.34 
The tax base remains quite undiversified and relies essentially on commodity and trade. 
The underperformances result partly from the commodity boom which, in the post-
colonial period, amplified citizens’ expectations from a welfare state and exacerbated 
their negligence, even their antagonism, vis-à-vis taxes.  
As a matter of fact, the well-known value-added tax (VAT) has been adopted in the 
DRC only in 2010.35 Many taxes are illegal or unknown, especially in the informal 
economy, due to the government’s inability to efficiently promote fiscal civic-
mindedness. Perhaps the lack of minimum living within everyone’s reach or 
counterpart—infrastructures, healthcare system, clean water, and electricity—
sociologically supports the mistrust of taxes. For Yabili, in the DRC, taxation has no social 
and cultural roots (it lacks an image, a justification, and a counterpart) before concluding 
that the independence in 1960 disposed of taxation policies then perceived as social 
constraints.36 
Cabral Libii, a presidential candidate for the 2018 election in Cameroon, pointed 
out, during a public speech on September 10, 2018 in Lyon, that people do not possess 
certification attesting ownership of their land, although they have been occupying those 
                                                        
34 See http://www.dgi.gouv.cd/statistiques/evolution-des-recettes.html (accessed March 30, 
2018). 
35 See RDC, Ordonnance-loi n°10/001 du 20 août 2010 portant institution de la Taxe sur la Valeur 
Ajoutée. 
36 See Marcel Yabili, 50.000 taxes. Fiscalité réglementaire en République Démocratique du Congo 
(Lubumbashi: Éditions Marcel Yabili, 2016), 51. 
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lands for years. These lands are called “national domain.” Land tenure should be given 
free of charge to those with customary properties. Such policy is an economic decision 
because it takes someone out of poverty.  
Actually, owning land endows one to apply for a banking loan to exploit that land 
and reimburse one’s loan. One can equally mortgage his/her land to acquire a share in 
agribusiness companies’ equity and, therefore, import machinery. The lack of access to 
land becomes a hindrance to the development of agribusiness and reinforces the economic 
effects of the resource curse. Thus, any exploitation of natural resources by the state on 
private property would give to the owner the right to a fair remuneration. However, how 
do economic achievements intersect with governance in a resource abundant country?  
 
B. Governance Deficit 
 
The second strand of the resource curse deals with questions of governance, which 
embody the rentier state and rent-seeking models.37 Rents are considered as “the ‘excess 
incomes,’ or the ‘proportion of earnings in excess of the minimum amount needed to 
attract a worker to accept a particular job or a firm to enter a particular industry.’”38  
This approach draws attention to natural resource-abundant countries’ tendency 
to experience higher levels of corruption and lower levels of governance than comparable 
countries lacking those minerals.39 As Obi upholds, the resource curse theory feeds certain 
                                                        
37 See Di John, “Is There Really a Resource Curse? A Critical Survey of Theory and Evidence,” 170. 
38 Ibid., 171. 
39 Jonathan Di John, “Is There really a Resource Curse?” 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s3BCuiW9rPc (accessed 02/08/2018). 
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perspectives on the nature of the DRC built upon abundant resource determinism that is 
subversive of development and democratic governance.40  
 A scientific tool, for the time being, to gauge African governance is the Ibrahim 
Index of African Governance (IIAG), an annual Index Report which monitors countries’ 
governance performance. The 2017 IIAG Index Report considers governance as “the 
provision of the political, social and economic public goods and services that every citizen 
has the right to expect from their state, and that a state has the responsibility to deliver to 
its citizens.”41 
For the years 2007-2016, overall governance (safety and rule of law, participation 
and human rights, sustainable economic opportunity, and human development), the DRC 
is ranked 48th out of 54 countries and registers increasing improvement. Yet this score 
cannot mask a bouncing back in personal safety42 as well as warning signs concerning the 
rule of law.43 Moreover, the average score across Africa mirrors slowing deterioration.44 
No reason can justify, for example, that no financial resources have been allocated to 
protection of “the Citizen’s Rights and Freedoms,” one amidst the sections of the state’s 
expenditure budget.45 
It might be said that the trend of accountability in the DRC is improving with 
regard to access to public information and public-sector accountability and 
                                                        
40 See Cyril Obi, “Oil as the ‘Curse’ of Conflict in Africa: Peering through the Smoke and Mirrors,” 
Conflict and Security in Africa, ed. Rita Abrahamsen (Woodbridge & Rochester, NY: James Currey and 
Boydell & Brewer, 2013), 67. 
41 Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2017 Ibrahim Index of African Governance: Index Report (2017), 9. 
Available at http://mo.ibrahim.foundation/iiag/downloads/ (accessed May 11, 2018). 
42 See ibid., 26. 
43 See ibid., 32. 
44 See ibid., 16-19. 
45 See Banque Centrale du Congo, Annual Report (2012), 109. 
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transparency,46 whereas the African average score exhibits no improvement. To a greater 
extent, “progress in accountability is held back by a large deterioration in corruption and 
bureaucracy and to a lesser extent in accountability of public officials.”47 The DRC (which 
ranked 161st out of 180 countries in the 2017 Transparency International Corruption 
Perception Index) is no exception with 21-22/100 stationary score transparency since 
2012.  
However, the country is not doing much to advance the agenda of the 2018 African 
Union: “Fighting Corruption in the Continent.” Unfortunately, the stereotypical labelling 
of conflicts in the DRC around natural resources shadows further data given by 
investigative reports on the illicit trade in natural resource and corruption involving state 
elites and rebel militias,48 hence impairing the country’s stability.  
 
C. Political Instability 
 
The very question about the resource curse is: “suppose new oil is discovered in a 
country, or more funds are transferred to a locality from a higher level of government. 
Are these windfalls of resources unambiguously beneficial to society?”49 The negative 
answer sourced from the Dutch disease does not exhaust a “growing literature [that 
                                                        
46 Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2017 Ibrahim Index of African Governance: Index Report, 34. 
47 Ibid., 35. 
48 See Collier quoted by Cyril Obi, “Oil as the ‘Curse’ of Conflict in Africa: Peering through the 
Smoke and Mirrors,” Conflict and Security in Africa, ed. Rita Abrahamsen (Woodbridge & Rochester, NY: 
James Currey and Boydell & Brewer: 2013), 66. 
49 Fernanda Brollo et al., “The Political Resource Curse,” American Economic Review 2013, 103 (5), 
1759. 
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points to] further adverse effects through the political process and the interaction among 
interest groups, leading for instance to increased rent-seeking or even to civil war.”50   
It is established that resource-abundant economies are more exposed to political 
violence and vulnerable to civil war.51 In effect, the resource curse explores “the 
connection between the paradox of resource abundance, conflict and poor economic 
growth… looking at a range of possible causes: social, political, geographic and 
economic.”52 Lujala credits this position with the distinction “between resource 
abundance as a ‘motivation and means’ (incentive) for ‘rebel uprisings’ (armed conflict), 
and as a causal link to ‘poor policy choices and a weak state.’”53  
The 2017 IIAG corroborates mounting concerns about the DRC national security 
bouncing back since 2007 due to violence by non-state actors and to domestic armed 
conflicts.54 It is believed that, in eastern Congo, conflicts benefit armed groups which 
illegally extract mineral resources. Peace and security experts have persistently reiterated 
the need for an immediate end to illegal exploitation of minerals in the Great Lakes 
region—DRC, Rwanda, and Burundi—arguing that it was fueling activities of armed 
groups operating in the DRC.55  
                                                        
50 Ibidem. 
51 Jonathan Di John, “Is There really a Resource Curse?” 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s3BCuiW9rPc (accessed 02/08/2018). 
52 Collier quoted by Cyril Obi, Ibid., 66.  
53 Lujala quoted by Cyril Obi, Ibidem. 
54 See ibid., 38-40. 
55 See “Armed Groups Surviving on Illegal Mining-Experts,” Africa News Service, (27 June 
2012). General OneFile 
http://link.galegroup.com/apps/doc/A294544712/ITOF?u=mlin_m_bostcoll&sid=ITOF&xid=84b562dd 
(accessed May 14, 2018). 
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The Bishops’ Conference of Congo’s Statement, J’ai vu la misère de mon peuple: Trop 
c’est trop! speaks out against the negative impact of the resource curse on political stability 
in strong terms, “Natural resources that make the DRC a ‘geological scandal’ are both a 
blessing, that is, an important economic asset for the country’s growth and a misfortune, 
that is to say, a permanent source of greed, conflict, corruption or even an international 
mafia in which some Congolese are accomplices.”56 
It follows that armed groups cannot be neutralized in eastern Congo unless their 
permanent source of funding—illegal exploitation of minerals—is finally cut off.57 Efforts 
are sought from all member states of the Great Lakes region to deliver a regional 
certification which would cleanse minerals to enable them access to international 
markets.58 It should be noted that the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS)59 as 
well as the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI)60 champion minerals 
certification on a global scale. The rise of such challenges definitely shadows the role of 
extractive industries which channel dislocations.  
 
                                                        
56 Conférence Épiscopale Nationale du Congo (CENCO), “J’ai vu la misère de mon peuple: Trop c’est 
trop!” (Kinshasa, 15 février 2003), 5.  
57 “Armed Groups Surviving on Illegal Mining-Experts,” Africa News Service, (27 June 2012). 
58 See ibidem. 
59 “The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) has been operational since 2003, and now 
covers virtually all countries with diamond producing, trading and polishing activities. It has been 
endorsed by several United Nations General Assembly and Security Council resolutions, and compliance 
with its requirements has been used by the Security Council as a benchmark for the lifting of diamond 
sanctions imposed on countries such as Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire.” See UNCTD, Word Investment Report 
2007: Transnational Corporations, Extractive Industries and Development (New York & Geneva: United 
Nations, 2007), 181. 
60 “The multi-stakeholder Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) was first launched 
by the then British Prime Minister Tony Blair at the World Summit on Sustainable Development at 
Johannesburg in 2002. It was the outcome of lobbying by NGOs and the civil society campaign, Publish 
What You Pay. The international anti-corruption movement, Transparency International, also played an 
important role.” See UNCTAD, Word Investment Report 2007, 180. 
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II. Catalytic Role of Extractive Industries  
 
The aforementioned context of dislocations reveals the DRC as a country 
“endowed with extractive industries such as oil, mining, and timber that are very capital-
intensive.”61 Actually, there exists no definition of extractive industries which is 
undebatable. They are considered in the global economy as “processes that involve the 
extraction of raw materials from the earth to be used by consumers [or] any operations 
that remove metals, mineral, and aggregates from the earth. Examples of extractive 
processes include oil and gas extraction, mining, dredging and quarrying.”62  
Reference to “raw materials from the earth” does not make a clear distinction 
between renewable and non-renewable resources. The UN Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) considers extractive industries as “primary activities involved 
in the extraction of non-renewable resources,” meaning that “they do not include such 
industries as agriculture, forestry and fisheries”63 aimed at extracting renewable 
resources. This description surprisingly adopts an enumerative approach to industries 
and purposely avoids using the concept “minerals” which expands what is meant by 
“non-renewable resources.” 
UNCTAD actually privileges an economic definition of minerals, “those that can 
be marketed for productive purposes,” that is, “energy minerals (oil, gas, coal and 
uranium), metallic minerals, and non-metallic minerals (industrial and construction 
                                                        
61 Andrea Goldstein, Nicolas Pinaud & Helmut Reisen, “The Rise of China and India: What’s in it 
for Africa?” Policy Insights 19 (May 2006), 2. 
62 See WebFinance, “Extractive Industry,” www.businessdictionary.com/definition/extractive-
industry.html (accessed May 6, 2018). 
63 UNCTAD, Word Investment Report 2007, 84. 
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minerals and precious stones).”64 An additional characteristic of extractive industries 
surfaces from this depiction, that is, resources extraction focuses exclusively on 
marketable or tradable minerals, tradability being “measured as the sum of a sector’s 
exports and imports over the gross output.”65  
This strand has been articulated before by Spencer. He considers that minerals 
extractive industries are concerned not only with the extraction of minerals at mines, 
quarries, pits, or wells, but also with the crushing, screening, washing, concentration, and 
other primary preparation of minerals which is usually carried on at such operations.66 
Thus, Spencer classifies extractive industries’ activities into four categories: fuel 
production, metal mining and ore dressing, stone quarrying and processing, and the 
production of minor nonmetals. 
Notwithstanding many achievements of extractive industries in the world, Sassen 
overall argues that, 
 
the exceptionally high profit-making capacity of many of the leading 
service industries is embedded in a complex combination of new trends. 
Among the most significant over the past twenty years are technologies 
that make possible the hypermobility of capital at a global scale; market 
deregulation, which maximizes the implementation of that hypermobility; 
and financial inventions such as securitization, which liquefy hitherto 
illiquid capital and allow it to circulate faster, hence generating additional 
profits (or loss).67 
 
                                                        
64 Ibidem. 
65 Rudolfs Bems, Aggregate Investment Expenditures on Tradable and Nontradable Goods (New York: 
International Monetary Fund, 2008), 7. 
66 See Vivian Eberle Spencer, Production, Employment, and Productivity in the Mineral Extractive 
Industries, 1880-1938 (Philadelphia, PA: Work Projects Administration, National Research Project, 1940), 6. 
67 Saskia Sassen, Expulsions: Brutality and Complexity in the Global Economy (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2014), 25. 
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For these reasons, extractive industries in the DRC often conflict with the interests 
of communities who accuse them of abuses, including brutal expropriation of their 
ancestral lands.  
In Jacques Nzumbu’s paper on strategic minerals published by Inkota-Germany, 
“the diagnosis is clear: cars pollute the environment and occupy too much space in the 
cities. After all, electric cars produce less harmful greenhouse gases than cars with 
internal combustion engines.”68  
It follows, according to this claim, that the transition to green energy makes the 
production and supply chains fueled by extractive industries even more ravenous for 
strategic minerals sought in manufacturing the five electric battery technologies available 
worldwide—Lithium Cobalt Oxide (LCO), Lithium nickel manganese cobalt (NMC), 
Lithium nickel cobalt aluminum (NCA), Lithium-iron phosphate (LFP), and Lithium 
manganese oxide (LMO)—for electric vehicles, electronics devices, and advanced 
weaponry. Since the DRC allegedly is rich in these five strategic minerals, it therefore 
attracts electric vehicles manufacturers and giants of electronics and weaponry.  
This means, on the one hand, that the extractive industries play a catalyzing role 
in the dislocations of the communities, since they are meant to supply a globally growing 
demand. On the other hand, it appears difficult to end armed conflicts in eastern Congo 
as long as the global demand for strategic minerals remains high, since conflicts in mining 
zones enable cheaper exploitation and fraudulent export. On the local scale, a kleptocratic 
                                                        
68 See: https://webshop.inkota.de/node/1548 (Accessed 2 October, 2018). Jacques Nzumbu, S.J., 
is a specialist in Mining Governance conducting research at the Jesuit “Centre Arrupe pour la Recherche 
et la Formation” (CARF) in Lubumbashi, DRC. 
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denial of capabilities to communities does not provide any reliable solution to 
dislocations. 
 
III. Kleptocratic Denial of Capabilities  
 
 While we are concerned with the theoretic attempt to link the resource curse to 
dislocations in the DRC, a guiding question shapes our reflection in this section: how does 
disowning land (kleptocracy) intersect with capabilities in the understanding of 
dislocations?  
 
A. Capability to Hold Property 
   
Mining-induced dislocations in the DRC as a political/economic threat cannot be 
grasped without an approach to comparative quality-of-life assessment and to theorizing 
about basic distributive justice, which Amartya Sen, an Indian economist and 
philosopher, and Martha Nussbaum, an American philosopher, insist are linked to 
human “capabilities.”69 
While the capabilities approach considers “each person as an end, asking not just 
about the total or average well-being but about the opportunities available to each 
person,” it resolutely addresses “choice or freedom, holding that [what] the crucial good 
                                                        
69 Martha Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities: The Human Development Approach (Cambridge, MA: 
Belknap/Harvard University Press, 2011), 18. 
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societies should be promoting for their people is a set of opportunities, or substantial 
freedoms.”70 What matters is the entrenchment of social injustice and inequalities.   
Taking up Sen, Nussbaum articulates human development in ten capabilities: life; 
bodily health; bodily integrity; senses, imagination, and thought; emotions; practical 
reason; affiliation; other species (concern for and relation to animals, plants, and other 
creatures); play (ability to laugh, to play, and to enjoy recreations); and control over one’s 
political and material environment.  
Ecclesially, lack of political control is denounced by the Bishops’ Conference of 
Congo. They voice social concerns and call upon the government to defend people’s 
interests, to promote development, and to create conditions for peace, security, property, 
and justice.71 Thus, although Nussbaum’s list does not make any distinctions based upon 
priorities, neither does she understand the capabilities to be achieved exclusively or 
selectively, realizing full human development entails a cumulative achievement of these 
capabilities. 
According to the Human Development Index, “human development is about 
human freedoms. It is about building human capabilities—not just for a few, not even for 
most, but for everyone.”72 Yet it limits itself to a set of three capabilities—the ability to 
lead a long and healthy life, measured by life expectancy at birth; the ability to acquire 
knowledge, measured by mean years of schooling and expected years of schooling; and 
                                                        
70 Ibidem. 
71 See Conférence Épiscopale Nationale du Congo (CENCO), “Soyez vigilants. La paix dans la 
justice et la vérité,” Message du Comité Permanent de la Conférence Épiscopale Nationale du Congo 
(Kinshasa, 12 février 2009), 3.  
72 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Human Development Indices and Indicators: 
2018 Statistical Update, 1. 
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the ability to achieve a decent standard of living, measured by gross national income per 
capita73—which exclude the right to land.  
Notwithstanding the other nine unmet capabilities in the DRC, Nussbaum’s tenth 
capability—control over material environment—is ethically bankrupt in the discussion at 
hand. Such a control extends to the ability “to hold property (both land and movable 
goods), and having property rights on an equal basis with others… having the freedom 
from unwarranted search and seizure.”74 We have the sense that this attempt at 
distributive justice is limited because Nussbaum admits to having provided at least a 
threshold level of the capabilities75 among an infinite list. Thus, the lack of elaboration on 
the capability to hold land property has been criticized by Freeman:   
  
The capabilities approach says little or nothing about the standards for 
deciding who should control the means of production; how widespread 
the distribution of land and capital should be; limits on accumulation of 
resources and wealth; the degree to which private or social ownership of 
natural resources and real capital are each in order; about government’s 
role in the economy and in ensuring full employment; about the kinds of 
property interests that are legitimate and their extent; permissible and 
impermissible uses of property; the relationship of distributive justice to 
the common good and exercise of basic rights and liberties, and so on. 
Other than questions of distribution of final product needed to reach the 
threshold of central capabilities, Nussbaum’s approach gives little if any 
guidance in resolving many of the crucial questions about the basic 
structure of economic life in a democratic society.76 
 
                                                        
73 See ibidem.  
74 Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities: The Human Development Approach, 34. 
75 See ibid., 32-33. 
76 Samuel Freeman, “Book Review-Frontiers of Justice: The Capabilities Approach versus 
Contractarianism,” Texas Law Review 85, 2 (2006), 409-410. 
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Whereas the state owns the soil and the subsoil, the capabilities approach sheds no 
light on three concerns. First, who has to own the land and exert a control over the means 
of production? Second, what property is legitimate to communities occupying ancestral 
lands without legally owning them? Finally, what is the role of distributive justice vis-à-
vis the communities’ fundamental right to property? Failing to answer these questions 
will likely leave unchallenged the current land-based kleptocracy. 
 
B. Kleptocratic Neo-Colonial Machine 
  
The peculiarity of the Belgian colonization in the DRC rests in its colonial machine 
of exploitation of the soil (rubber, etc.) and the subsoil (mineral resources) for the benefit 
of the colonizer.  
Philosophers agree that a “kleptocracy is a state that systematically steals from its 
citizens in order to increase its own wealth and power.”77 As a consequence,  
 
kleptocracies block the mutual benefits that generate economic growth, and 
in doing so, [they concentrate] power in ruling elites. In a kleptocracy, the 
government appropriates resources, natural or not, at will. These regimes 
prey on those who produce and end up harming everyone except 
themselves and those who help them stay in power. Interestingly, 
kleptocracies can be democratic and observe traditional civil rights… [The 
Law] enables kleptocrats by expressly announcing that the state owns 
natural resources and that they, the government, can use and dispose of 
those resources at will.78  
 
                                                        
77 Fernando R. Tesón, “Revising International Law: A Liberal Account of Natural Resources,” 
San Diego Law Review 52, 1123 (2015), 1141-1142. 
78 Ibid., 1142. 
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The DRC legal framework governing land embraces the 1966 (Bakajika Law), 1971, 1973, 
and 1980 Laws, which seem outdated as a means to protect communities. A sterling 
example of appropriation of resources is seen in the management of mining concessions 
where the contracts “legally” concluded between government and investors rarely meet 
the expectations of smallholders.  
As Walter Fluker, a Martin Luther King Jr. Professor of Ethical Leadership at 
Boston University, fittingly points out, “the error of many public leaders is that they have 
failed to acknowledge the presence of masses of disinherited and dispossessed groups 
within [their] power configurations.”79  
Similarly, for the francophone Belgian Justice and Peace Commission, while 
assigning lands to foreign companies or private and wealthy investors, even though such 
properties are already exploited by local populations living there, the state inevitably 
violates some of the fundamental rights of rural populations, such as the right to control 
the land they own and the right to food.80  
The appropriation of resources by government was legitimated when “the 1966 
Bakajika Law81 granted all wealth above and below the ground to the Congolese state. It 
thus extinguished all land grants and concessionary power delegated by the colonial state. 
The law aimed primarily at ensuring that public mineral rights went to the 
government.”82 It became quite normalized that citizens cannot benefit from natural 
                                                        
79 Walter Earl Fluker, Ethical Leadership: The Quest for Character, Civility, and Community 
(Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2009), 61. 
80 See www.justicepaix.be/IMG/pdf/2011_Analyse_Accaparement_des_terres_en_RDCongo.pdf 
(Accessed September 23, 2018). 
81 Ordonnance-Law 66-343 promulgated on 7 June 1966. 
82 Emizet François Kisangani & Scott F. Bobb, Historical Dictionary of the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, 3rd ed. (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2010), 36. 
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resources without declaring them to the state administration, which issues a certificate 
against payment of fees. One may suspect that “the prospect of appropriating their 
society’s natural resources is a major incentive for politicians seeking power.”83 
 Dislocations of indigenous people by multinationals which the post-colonial 
theories in Africa call “the neo-colonial machine” are therefore fueled by existing 
kleptocracies. For many decades, the “neo-colonial machine” has been a flourishing 
theory in African studies concerned with the experience of colonial domination and 
subsequent deliverance, postcolonial political domination, and material poverty.84  
“The neo-colonial machine” is a metaphor for a system of exploitation which 
extractive industries and transnational companies incarnate; no wonder the neo-colonial 
machine replaced the colonial powers in the grand scheme of exploiting Africa’s raw 
material.85 Gichaara is convinced that “the African social-economic and political crisis is 
profoundly theological and the African church is unavoidably a significant sight in the 
ensuing struggle.”86 Yet the Church tends to be the missing voice and “continues to 
operate as if there is not a social and ecclesial challenge”87 from the neo-colonial machine. 
For these reasons, the Congolese Bishops’ Conference believes that the political 
leaders are confined in a logic that is contrary to the ideals of independence. In the 
Bishops’ opinion, the national project supporting the idea of state sovereignty has been 
                                                        
83 Tesón, “Revising International Law: A Liberal Account of Natural Resources,” 1142. 
84 See Jonathan Gichaara, “Issues in African Liberation Theology,” Black Theology: An 
International Journal 3.1 (2005), 75-85. 
85 See ibid., 81. 
86 Ibid., 82. 
87 Nader Michel, “Human/Cultural Rights of Asylum Seekers/Refugees and Labor Migrants,” 
Living With(Out) Borders: Catholic Theological Ethics on the Migrations of Peoples, eds. Agnes M. Brazal & 
Maria Teresa Davila (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2016), 32. 
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erased by the loss or abandonment of the call to authentic independence from exploitive 
powers. An explanation for this neo-colonialism and imperialism is the looting of the 
country’s natural resources.88 
 Through these hermeneutic lenses, Africa in general is described as a continent 
shaken by a form of impoverishment which Engelbert Mveng, S.J., termed 
“anthropological poverty”—e.g., crimes of the slave trade and misdeeds of colonialism in 
Africa.89 A philosophical response to the “neo-colonial machine” is therefore to creatively 
revive a work ethic that enables Africans to define themselves not as debtors but as 
children of God who are called to re-humanize the world and make it a better place.90  
Jean-Marc Éla, a Cameroonian sociologist and theologian, consequently maps the 
role of ethics vis-à-vis extractive industries while he reminds us that Africans better find 
ways to manifest a subversive power vis-à-vis financial powers by questioning unfair 
systems from the point of view of the poor and the oppressed.91  
From this perspective, minerals as non-renewable resources raise the crucial 
question of sustainable development in the DRC. It has become common place to quote 
the 1987 UN World Commission of Environment and Development’s definition of this 
concept as “meeting the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet their own needs,”92 an approach which highlights the commitment 
to equity with future generations (intergenerational equity). Unfortunately, nothing is 
                                                        
88 See Conférence Épiscopale Nationale du Congo (CENCO), “Faudrait-il encore que le sang 
coule en R.D. Congo ?” 3. 
89 René Heyer, “Annihilation anthropologique et anthropologie de la vie: Une discussion 
critique des thèses du P. Mveng,” Théologie africaine et vie 19, 1 (2011), 133.  
90 See Samuel Kobia quoted by Jonathan Gichaara, “Issues in African Liberation Theology,” 82.  
91 See Jean-Marc Éla, My Faith as an African (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2009), 152. 
92 See http://www.un-documents.net/our-common-future.pdf (accessed 21 October, 2018). 
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being done in the DRC to prevent abusive exploitation of minerals. What can be 
recommended?  
 
Conclusion 
 
While it is believed that China invests USD 300 billion in trade with Africa, ten 
times more than the United States, the presence of multinationals in the DRC exacerbates 
dislocations of indigenous people in mining areas. Of course, these dislocations are not 
caused by conflict around the mines alone. They are fueled by inequitable legal 
procedures of engagement with the impacted communities. Some recommendations 
should be made. 
First, the legal framework should be reformed so as to recognize to communities’ 
property rights over their ancestral lands. In this way, the DRC government should 
strengthen the rule of law; yet lack of strong leadership and the prevailing impunity 
constitute serious obstacles which the country will need to overcome.  
Second, dislocations and illicit minerals exploitations are channeled by persistent 
armed conflicts. Lack of political will to overcome such conflicts for two decades remains 
suspicious and, in many ways, leads to conjecture that some government officials benefit 
from this conflict situation to appropriate natural resources.  
Ultimately, an Intergenerational Equity Fund (IEF) should be established as in 
Senegal or, at least, protected areas against mining should be defined for safeguarding 
the interests of future generations.  
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The nature and impact of the resource curse as well as kleptocracy and political 
dynamics at play fuel mining-induced conflict, which result in involuntary resettlement 
of local communities.  
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CHAPTER 2:  
 
INVOLUNTARY RESETTLEMENT IN MINING-INDUCED CONFLICT 
 
 
Introduction 
 
While our previous chapter was concerned with identifying theories which are 
helpful to explain dislocations, the following discussion brings to the fore the question: 
how is it possible to create conditions for reconciliation between mining companies and 
the dislocated communities? However, it should be noted from the outset that 
dislocations are not caused by conflicts—i.e., a clash between communities and mining 
corporations—around the mines, but by a mishandled legal procedure of engagement 
which impacts communities. Neither are we concerned here with documented data on 
dislocations.93 
As Saskia Sassen puts it, “we are confronting a formidable problem in our global 
political economy: the emergence of new logics of expulsion.”94 Such logics are embedded 
in “the eviction of millions of small farmers in poor countries owing to the 220 million 
hectares of land, or over 540 million acres, acquired by foreign investors and governments 
since 2006.”95 Therefore, more than 10 million people are involuntarily displaced and 
                                                        
93 Whereas many ground-led researches on mining-induced dislocations in the DRC are 
documented, they lack comprehensive data. So, my effort to support this research with figures has been 
unproductive.  
94 Saskia Sassen, Expulsions: Brutality and Complexity in the Global Economy (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2014), 1 (Emphasis in original). 
95 Ibid., 3. 
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resettled worldwide to make way for development projects such as mining.96 This 
explosive context discloses a global tragedy which especially affects the Global South. We 
are left with the conviction that “community and company interests frequently overlap 
and clash, with conflicts taking place not only among factions but also within the lives of 
individual citizens who themselves may have competing needs.”97  
Proceeding from the widespread eviction of local communities by mining 
companies, I argue that mining-induced conflicts are resolvable as long as the land grabs 
narrative highlights the bankruptcy of state governance, while the land tenure is reformed 
to recognize land property rights, and alternative justice is envisaged.    
To be successful in this enterprise, I have outlined my reflection in three parts. First, 
the land grabs narrative maps conflicts arising from what communities consider as the 
grabbing of ancestral land. Second, this reality leads me to propose the improvement of 
the land tenure framework. Finally, alternative justice is deemed efficient in handling 
mining-induced conflicts.  
 
I. Land Grabs Narrative 
  
Land grabs are not exclusively limited to Africa. For Borras, the strands of this 
concept are “control grabbing” which entails a scale of land acquisitions and/or a scale of 
capital involved, occurring because of and within the dynamics of capital accumulation 
                                                        
96 Michael Cernea quoted by Theodore E. Downing, Avoiding New Poverty: Mining-Induced 
Displacement and Resettlement (London: IIED & WBCSD, 2002), 6. 
97 Ronald Heifitz, Leadership Without Easy Answers (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1994), 22. 
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strategies, largely in response to the convergence of multiple crises: food, energy/fuel, 
climate change, financial crisis.98  
To a large extent, land grabs result from global market drifts where “more than 200 
million hectares of land are estimated to have been acquired from 2006 to 2011 by foreign 
governments and firms”99 worldwide. It is not surprising, for instance, that “millions of 
Brazilian smallholders have been expelled from their farmland, which has been taken 
over by vast soya plantations that produce for export.”100 Hence, “the eviction of farmers 
and craftspeople, villages, rural manufacturing districts, and districts of agricultural 
smallholders similarly degrades the meaning of citizenship for local people.”101  
The preamble to the Congolese 2002 Mining Law takes a look back to the 1930s to 
acknowledge that “minerals production volume was larger from 1937 to 1966, unlike the 
period of 1967 to 1996 under the 1981 Mining Law. Forty-eight mining companies were 
active from 1937 to 1966, while only thirty-eight companies operated from 1967 to 1996 
and 7 companies after 1997.”102 Such a counter performance mirrors many underlying 
factors—economic, legal, political, and social103—which justify land grabs and expulsions 
of local communities, hence inducing mining conflicts.  
Economically, the mining production fall-off, due to bad control systems from 
companies and artisanal minors, discloses the lack of professionalism in the Congolese 
                                                        
98 Saturnino M. Borras Jr. et al., “Land Grabbing in Latin America and the Caribbean,” The 
Journal of Peasant Studies 39 (2012), 850-851. 
99 Sassen, Expulsions: Brutality and Complexity in the Global Economy, 80. 
100 Ibid., 82. 
101 Ibid., 83. 
102 République Démocratique du Congo, Loi n° 007/2002 du 11 juillet 2002 portant code minier. 
103 The following data are from my email interview with the Arrupe Centre for Research and 
Training (CARF, Lubumbashi, DRC), November 22, 2017. 
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mining sector. Moreover, the opacity of the mining finance circuit, driven by “corporate 
greed,”104 exacerbates the country’s dependency on mining incomes. Hence, it exposes 
the national economic mineral slump and exogenous shocks.  
This empirical explanation discloses low industrialization of the mining sector, 
problems of certification, traceability, and warranty of the Congolese non-conflict-
affected minerals. Thus, the context makes it uncomfortable to question the weakness of 
both the mining agencies and the financial institutions, as well as the challenge of minerals 
supply chains. 
 To better understand mining-induced conflict, one needs to scrutinize the Eastern 
Congo political context which has been dominated by armed conflicts since 1996. In this 
zone, a war economy exacerbates violence, facilitates “blood ore,” and land grabs by 
multinationals. The lack of regional and international cooperation in preventing mining-
induced conflicts gives little hope of political stability.  
Indeed, the improvement of political leadership could preclude the deals between 
the financiers and the political leaders, corruption, and politicization of the mining 
economy. As a consequence, poor management and complacent control over 
multinationals benefit illicit minerals traders. 
 This context results in social crisis. The involvement of children and women in the 
artisanal and small-scale mining and the minerals supply chain raises questions about the 
companies’ ethical practices and compliance with international standards. There is reason 
                                                        
104 John W. de Gruchy, Reconciliation Restoring Justice (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2002), 
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to question why the minerals certification and traceability standards are so feebly 
concerned with women and children labor in mining.  
This legal void presumably establishes mining areas in the DRC as an Eldorado 
where women and children are exposed to violence, prostitution, diseases—HIV/AIDS, 
cholera, and malaria—sexual abuses, and economic exploitation. The reform of the land 
tenure should, therefore, be one of the remedies to the impasse.  
 
II. Need for Land Tenure Reform 
 
 Based on NGOs’ data, two dominant traits characterize mining exploitation in 
Eastern Congo. They are related to the concessionary land tenure and the overuse of 
membership contracts. 
 
A. The Concessionary Land Tenure Flaws 
  
 Historically, the concessionary land tenure originates in the Bakajika Law: 
 
Promulgated on 7 June 1966 as Ordonnance-Law 66-343, the Bakajika Law 
granted all wealth above and below the ground to the Congolese state. It 
thus extinguished all land grants and concessionary power delegated by 
the colonial state. The law aimed primarily at ensuring that public mineral 
rights went to the government. Despite this law, the colonial system of 
land control and alienation continued. The first major change came in 
1973, in the form of another “Bakajika Law.” All land, including land that 
was administrated by chiefs, became state property. Customary law, as 
codified under colonial rule, ceased to be a legitimate source of land rights. 
Chiefs were also integrated into the state’s administrative hierarchy, and 
attempts were made to shift them to posts outside their home areas, as 
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was being done with higher-ranking territorial administrators, from the 
territorial to the provincial level.105   
 
Besides these controversies, key factors igniting mining-related conflicts under the 
concessionary land tenure exacerbate the asymmetry of land laws and lack of prior 
information to the victims of forced resettlement. 
 
1. The Asymmetry of Land-Related Laws 
 
The Dutch Cordaid Foundation’s 2015 Report points out the asymmetry of the laws 
governing mining, land, and agriculture. The lack of proportion facilitates land grabbing 
by mining companies to the detriment of communities constantly forced to uproot 
themselves.106 This report obviously highlights the omnipresence of economic tensions 
induced by an inharmonious enforcement of three conflicting regulations—land, farming, 
and mining laws—which govern the land and its mineral substances.  
The core causes of economic tension, according to Centre Arrupe pour la Recherche et 
la Formation (CARF),107 are corruption and mismanagement of the mining income—
following the 1996 and 1998 liberation wars—driven by the inefficiency of tax and royalty 
policies, which led to the decrease of income from mining to boost the national economy.  
                                                        
105 Emizet François Kisangani & Scott F. Bobb, Historical Dictionary of the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, 3rd ed. (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2010), 36. 
106 See Cordaid, Exploitation minière au cœur des zones rurales: quel développement pour les 
communautés locales? Rapport (La Haye: Cordaid, 2015), 32. 
107 My email interview with Jacques Nzumbu, S.J., from the Arrupe Centre for Research and 
Training (CARF, Lubumbashi, DRC), November 22, 2017. 
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A few reasons explain the social conflict exacerbated by the 2002 Mining Law 
which determined the primacy of mining rights over land property rights. Concretely, the 
rights deriving from mining concessions are distinct from those resulting from land 
concessions, so that the land concessionaire cannot use his/her tenure to claim any 
property right over the underground mineral substances.108 This provision conflicts with 
the well-known principle of property Law according to which, “Accessory [mineral 
substances] follows the principal [land],” so that the owner of the principal owns the 
accessory as well. Purposeful separation between accessory and principal is reflective of 
the government’s resolve to keep control over minerals.  
As a consequence, this ambiguity validates the precariousness of land occupation 
(as giving way to companies to exploit the subsoil can legitimize the expulsion of local 
communities) and the prohibition of the landowner from possessing the subsoil, 
especially the mineral substances. Overall, the state is the owner of all the land and may 
grant perpetual or temporary concession to Congolese physical or juridical persons.  
It follows that the concessionary regime grants an unwarranted permission to 
communities to occupy the land owned by the state, which can concede the same property 
to mining companies. Given this precariousness, “some argue that because governments 
grant companies concessions for mining, they should accept responsibility for the 
resulting impoverishment”109 of the local communities. Likewise, “Governments might 
also be indifferent to the plight of the displaced; in this case, mining interests and their 
                                                        
108 See République Démocratique du Congo, Loi N° 007/2002 du 11 juillet 2002 portant Code 
minier, article 3, 3. 
109 Theodore E. Downing, Avoiding New Poverty, 16. 
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financiers are considered willing accomplices to what may be judged by others to be an 
unethical business transaction.”110 
The immediate impoverishment results, at first glance, in the loss of “their fields, 
river, orchards and other cultural infrastructures such as churches, schools, cemeteries, 
trees, and medicinal plants, etc.”111 In reality, forced displacement is not possible without 
expropriation; but in the DRC, this expropriation does not comply with the legal 
requirements which command that, in case of dislocation of population, the mining 
company must pay prior redress and compensation, and organize the resettlement of the 
concerned communities.112 
This ambiguity induced by law—in the Thomistic understanding of the law as 
grounded in reason, and promulgated by a legitimate authority for the common good—
does not make it possible to conclude whether affected communities should be 
transferred, consistent with the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 
policies and procedures, for public purpose, in a non-discriminatory manner, in 
accordance with due process of law, against a just and prior payment of compensation.113 
There is reason to examine whether involuntary resettlement of local communities (to 
give way to mining companies) complies with the first criterion. 
With regard to “what constitutes ‘public purpose’ or ‘public interest’”114 as 
                                                        
110 See ibidem. 
111 Action Contre l’Impunité pour les Droits Humains (ACIDH), Mémorandum à Monsieur le 
Gouverneur du Katanga (Lubumbashi: 27 juin 2011), 2. 
112 RDC, Loi n°18/001 modifiant et complétant la Loi n° 007/2002 du 11 juillet 2002 portant Code 
minier, article 281.  
113 UNCTAD, Expropriation (New York & Geneva: United Nations, 2012), 27. 
114 Allahyar Mouri, The International Law of Expropriation as Reflected in the Work of the Iran-U.S. 
Claims Tribunal (Dordrecht, Boston & London: Martinus Nijhoff, 1994), 326. 
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opposed to private interest, scholars have always felt uncomfortable laying down a 
comprehensive definition. Lack of a precise definition is “a result of the modern 
acceptance” according to which states “are granted extensive discretion” in interpreting 
what they lawfully consider as public purpose.115 However, its impact on public use 
reflects whether the land usage has any public purpose distinct from private interest. As 
a consequence, land restitution applies when such a public purpose cannot be fulfilled.  
The question of whether mining activities pursue public or private interest remains 
debatable. While mining incomes contribute greatly to the State budget, profit-making 
and repatriation of the revenue, which constitute the multinationals’ business goal, 
exclude public interest.  
As disclosed by CARF, the Congolese economy mostly withstands low processing 
of mineral resources before export and suffers a lack of information about the value and 
the supply chains of mining corporations; it equally unveils the deficiency of socially 
responsible mining investments (SRMI) and the problems of monitoring subcontracts.116 
Besides, mining activities raise concerns about unemployment or poor job creation, 
violence against children and women involved in mining, going along with deforestation, 
air pollution, water and land pollution making agriculture unfruitful.117 
Socially, unsuccessful implementation of corporate social responsibility, poverty, 
alcoholism, promiscuity, and prostitution in the mining fields constantly call into public 
interest which the land concession supposedly pursues. More complex are the 
                                                        
115 See ibid., 327. 
116 My email interview with the Arrupe Centre for Research and Training (CARF, Lubumbashi, 
DRC), November 22, 2017. 
117 See ibidem. 
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implications of the lack of the communities’ consent to their displacement and relocation. 
 
2. Lack of Free Prior and Informed Consent 
 
It might be said, as NGOs denounce, that on map-based decisions, the financiers 
acquire mining licenses from the government and relocate local communities from their 
lands without their consent. The failure of the companies to engage in dialogue with the 
relocatees as an essential condition of displacement and relocation is conducive to abuses. 
Accordingly, there arises the question of companies deciding “to relocate families... by 
granting them a short delay to evacuate the houses with the obligation to demolish them 
against payment of weak compensations.”118 
John Owen and Deanna Kemp describe this pattern this way: “The mining industry 
has become deeply engaged in a number of complex and contentious social policy 
debates, including ‘business and human rights’, ‘free prior and informed consent’ 
(FPIC).”119 Indeed, the absence of consent mirrors a forced displacement and makes 
transfer unlawful, unlike contractual policies which privilege not only the State 
regulation, but also negotiation and public debate. Apparently, “the extent to which 
different stakeholders [government, financiers, etc.] recognize the resettlement or 
program elements as either ‘forced’ or ‘voluntary’ is not disclosed”120 by law.  
As a consequence, Initiative Bonne Gouvernance et Droits Humains (IBGDH), a 
                                                        
118 Initiative Bonne Gouvernance et Droits Humains (IBGDH), “Kolwezi: les communautés 
locales face aux géants miniers,” La voix des communautés locales 1 (2017), 2. 
119 John R. Owen & Deanna Kemp, “Mining-Induced Displacement and Resettlement: A Critical 
Appraisal,” Journal of Cleaner Production 87 (2015), 480. 
120 See ibidem. 
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Katanga-based NGO, holds, “local communities are often startled, not sufficiently 
informed about the relocation plan and the evaluation of their property. In addition, local 
communities are subject to membership contracts, without any possibility of negotiation 
or recourse, and the displacement operations are driven by [companies’] 
intimidations.”121 In these unequal dynamics between companies and local communities, 
power abuses occur and should be addressed as human rights violations under article 17 
of the 1948 UNDHR which provides, “Everyone has the right to own property alone as 
well as in association with others. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.” 
In contrast, as the communities’ land occupancy results from concession, this 
tenuousness exacerbates their vulnerability which companies exploit to advance false 
compensation promises. For instance, “to obtain the consent of Kishiba natives to the 
mining project, Frontier Company accompanied by Congolese officials promised… the 
building of modern houses with more space for each family that would agree to relocate 
to the newly established Kimfumpa village; clean water and electricity supply to the 
village; building of new primary and secondary schools, hospital and roads that would 
connect the new village to the company’s facilities, etc.”122 which the company failed to 
fulfill.  
The FPIC debate, therefore, discloses manifold approaches, the most familiar of 
which admits the need to obtain the consent of indigenous peoples under some 
circumstances, as Owen and Kemp contend: 
 
                                                        
121 IBGDH, “Kolwezi: les communautés locales face aux géants miniers,” 2. 
122 ACIDH, Mémorandum à Monsieur le Gouverneur du Katanga, 2. 
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It is widely presumed that community consent can only be achieved 
under circumstances of full disclosure and protection of the ‘right to 
know’. Providing information to communities that may not have 
experienced mining or any major development for that matter, poses a 
significant challenge. Levels of uncertainty intensify where developers 
are not in a position to disclose impacts because they are not yet known 
or have not been modelled.123 
 
FPIC derives from the communities’ right to know. It should focus primarily on 
foreseeable risks the community will undergo as a result of displacement and relocation, 
mining effects on human health, and environmental or social impacts. Concretely, 
companies claim the difficulty “to understand how consent could ever be regarded as 
‘informed’ when significant impacts that will invariably change the shape and function 
of community life were not clear at project start-up.”124  
This thought appears realistic, yet it provides an outlet to companies which may 
equally allege the unforeseeability of risks to disclaim liability—a situation which is not 
uncommon—for human, social and environmental effects of mining activities, while the 
precautionary principle compels taking actions in case of doubt or uncertainty. Perhaps 
the overuse of membership contracts by companies is the primary worry about the 
Congolese mining-related legal framework. 
 
B. The Overuse of Membership Contracts 
 
The specificity of membership contracts rests on terms and conditions agreed in 
advance by one of the parties, usually the professional, and proposed for access to the 
                                                        
123 John R. Owen & Deanna Kemp, “Mining-Induced Displacement and Resettlement,” 486. 
124 See ibidem. 
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economically dependent contractor, the non-professional. Although membership 
contracts save time and display a real pragmatism, they do not offer the possibility of 
negotiation. It should be understood that the essential stipulations must have been 
imposed and are unable to be discussed;125 so, mining companies and local communities 
are unable to modify by simple agreement the terms of their relationship.126 
Further, pre-established terms and conditions prevent the relocatees’ appreciation 
of eventual risks and seriously question the validity of their consent. One may be 
surprised that for such an important issue (the displacement of local communities) with 
the apparent approval of the government, companies make use of non-negotiable 
contracts. This aspect supports the vision of companies’ control over mining decisions in 
DRC, with a significant impact on security in mining areas continuously assaulted by 
armed groups.   
One of the objects of foreign direct investment is contributing to the host country’s 
economic development. This criterion is fulfilled when the project fits into the country’s 
needs and arouses the support of communities for its success. Yet, without negotiation 
with those communities, how do mining companies balance the pursuit of profit and 
participation in the country’s development within the Congolese legal framework?  
Business ethicists uphold that, “rules enacted for businesses to follow are mostly 
border-bound laws; and these laws remain subject to change as the political and juridical 
climate into which they have been inserted changes.”127 This is correct as the instability of 
                                                        
125 See Brigitte Lefebvre, “Le contrat d’adhésion,” La Revue du Notariat 105 (2003), 450. 
126 See René Dussault & Louis Borgeat, Traité de droit administratif, vol. 2 (Québec: Presses de 
l’Université Laval, 1986), 162. 
127 Edmund F. Byrne, “Business Ethics Should Study Illicit Businesses: To Advance Respect for 
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the Congolese administration, due to unpredictable changes in leadership, cannot 
guarantee sustainable conflict resolution between communities and companies. Further, 
the political and judicial climate lays out the groundwork for corruption of community 
leaders benefitting from some controversial companies.  
In this respect, membership contracts leading to abuse of economic power could 
be perceived as neocolonialist policy. Yet, a top-down solution looks unconvincing since 
expulsions constitute a multifaceted situation whereby smallholders are pushed out of 
employment and forced into poverty.128 Relocation and reorientation of communities 
being tumultuous,129 we modestly envisage alternative justice as an appropriate 
mechanism for handling mining-induced conflict.   
 
III. Search for Alternative Justice 
 
Alternative justice differs from court justice. It promotes alternative mechanisms 
of dispute settlement—arbitration, conciliation, mediation, and transaction. However, 
African societies are also governed by ancestral customs which shape ethical standards. 
It is important, on the one hand, to notice the ineffectiveness of African traditional 
patterns to address mining-induced conflicts and, on the other hand, to consider 
extrajudicial mechanisms as relatively reliable.  
 
                                                        
Human Rights,” Journal of Business Ethics 103 (2011), 498. 
128 Alejandro Portes, “Review of Saskia Sassen’s Expulsions,” Trajectories 27, 3 (2016), 63. 
129 Janvier Kilosho, Nik Stoop & Marijke Verpoorten, “The Social Minefield of Gold Digging in 
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A. The Ineffectiveness of African Traditional Patterns 
 
Bénézet Bujo claims that, in traditional African ethics, the Palaver praxis—an 
African mechanism for resolving grievances through dialogue—as a process for 
discovering and justifying norms is consistent with the legal epistemology. The Court is 
an intersection where the parties and the assembly are elevated to better understanding 
of the law. The concept of justice, for example, remains speculative until “Justice has to be 
seen to be done,” as a general principle of Law goes. However, this educational ambition 
may not be achieved because the jurisdictional mechanism relies on an inaccessible 
language.  
Niagalé Bagayoko and Fahiraman Rodrigue, two African studies scholars, outline 
a few patterns of conflict resolution from the Sub-Saharan African traditions. For them, 
more than rituals is at stake while addressing conflict resolution patterns in traditional 
African ethics. The African traditional mechanisms increasingly interest peace studies 
because they provide a mixture of approaches.  
First, the reality of political mechanisms involving village chiefs, tribal kings, and 
customary courts is the bulwark of the community’s stability.130 Restoring order and 
social balance remains the fundamental concern in the traditional chiefdom approach; it 
is not concerned with condemning or giving credit, since the judgment is aimed at 
strengthening the social group.131  
                                                        
130 See Niagalé Bagayoko & Fahiraman Rodrigue Koné, “Les mécanismes traditionnels de 
gestion des conflits en Afrique Sub-Saharienne,” Rapport de recherche FrancoPaix 2 (2017), 18. 
131 See ibidem. 
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While the traditional chiefdoms are at the crossroads of two worlds—the living 
community and the ancestors—they are also the depository of public morality. As such, 
they are beyond suspicion and play a prominent mediation role using the Palaver praxis. 
It has become a commonplace, for example, to acknowledge the moral and political 
influence of Mogho Naaba, the traditional king of the Mossi, the majority ethnic group in 
Burkina Faso, both in mobilization for the 2014 revolution and in mediation among 
military factions, which spared Burkina Faso from a bloodshed.  
In fact, traditional leaders have always been involved in land-related dispute 
settlements. A number of studies in post-apartheid South Africa have consistently 
reported that, “during colonialism native access to land, administration, representation, 
and dispute settlement was organized through traditional authorities established for 
differentiated groups of ‘natives’ based on ‘tribal ethnicity.’”132 Yet this traditional 
mechanism lacks a legal basis and does not do justice to international corporations, which 
are wary of local laws and customs to settle mining-induced disputes. Instead, they resort 
to international arbitration and courts.   
The strength of what Max Weber calls the traditional authority consists here in 
entrusting to the leader a divine legitimacy, which relies on the customs and the belief 
that his/her power is sacred. While this belief represents a symbolic capital, which can be 
invested in conflict resolution, it may also constrain the community to blindly commit 
abuse. In his paper on the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, for example, Yves Tervon claims that 
                                                        
132 Sarah Bruchhausen & Camalita Naicher, “Broadening Conceptions of Democracy and 
Citizenship: The Subaltern Histories of Rural Resistance in Mpondoland and Marikana,” Land Reform 
Revisited: Democracy, State Making and Agrarian Transformation in Post-Apartheid South Africa, Femke Brandt 
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“the formation of militias is an old Rwandan tradition: the hill chiefs constituted small 
troops to defend their property, but these troops were under the king. There, militias 
depended on extremist parties.”133 
Related to political mechanisms activated by the traditional authority is the role 
of festive celebrations as social appeasement mechanisms. Niagalé and Fahiraman evoke 
the annual celebration of the yam harvest festival in West African traditions (Baoulé, 
Agni, Akyé, Abbey, etc.). Although this celebration is not primarily meant for resolving 
grievances, “it is recommended that prior to the celebration, all intra-family conflicts 
which occurred throughout the year be resolved. All conflicts that arose in the lineages 
must be brought before the family leader who resolves them. Non-resolution of such 
conflicts provokes serious risks for the families and the entire community.”134  
The assumption here is that festive celebrations are not a conflict resolution 
platform, yet they bring people together and offer the unique opportunity to extinguish 
conflicts, to cross borders, and to reach out to others.135 However, the pattern of 
reconciliation it offers is volatile and cannot resolve a large-scale conflict involving 
international economic interests. 
Emphasis is often put on religious mechanisms of conflict resolution. As Niagalé 
and Fahiraman note, sacred rituals always speak of reconciliation and reparation of faults. 
                                                        
133 Yves Ternon, “Rwanda 1994: Analyse d’un processus génocidaire,” Revue d’Histoire de la 
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This sacred dimension stems from the perception of conflict as the source of social and 
spiritual disorder because, for most communities, it attracts evil spirits and causes death 
in the clan. Activation of so-called “unconditional peace” mechanisms increases the 
effectiveness of reconciliation based on the psychological constraints and the fear of a 
mystical sanction. Niangoran-Bouah, an anthropologist from Ivory Coast, outlines the 
“unconditional peace” mechanism: 
 
In a conflict, when the weakest feels that his/her antagonist is ready to 
punch him/her, and if the latter does not want to be beaten, he/she is 
obliged to pronounce this ritual formula which literally prevents the 
strongest from striking: “Ntale ntcha te” (Abouré) [meaning], “I hold a 
man’s head.” Whatever his/her anger, the strongest must refrain from 
hitting, knowing that his/her antagonist is empty-handed. The 
pronouncement of this formula places oneself under the protection of 
the ancestors. Striking after one has heard it is an offense to the 
ancestors.136 
 
Overall, African traditional mechanisms lack effectiveness and legitimacy to provide 
sustainable solution to mining-induced conflicts, due to their inclination to exclusion 
based on socially hierarchical relations, and social and gender inequalities.137 Because 
they are customary, religious, and mystical mechanisms, they cannot satisfy the expelled 
communities “who hunger and thirst for righteousness” (Mt. 5:6) with a better 
compensation. Extrajudicial approaches are likely more reliable. 
 
  
                                                        
136 Georges Niangoran-Bouah quoted by Niagalé Bagayoko & Fahiraman Rodrigue Koné, “Les 
mécanismes traditionnels de gestion des conflits en Afrique Sub-Saharienne,” 34. 
137 See ibid., 42. 
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B. The Reliability of Extrajudicial Mechanisms 
 
Pursuant to the 2018 Mining Law, amicable dispute settlement is carried out by all 
non-judicial procedures, including transaction, compromise, and arbitration.138 The 
lawmaker obviously posits the extrajudicial approach as the primordial attempt to settle 
mining-induced conflicts. We identify them under the banner of restorative justice and 
restitutive justice, two strands of alternative justice, assuming that they are more effective 
than African traditional mechanisms. 
 
1. Restorative Justice  
 
At first glance, the best-suited approach toward peace-building between mining 
companies and local communities could be restorative justice, “a process whereby all the 
parties with a stake in a particular offence come together to resolve collectively how to 
deal with the aftermath of the offense and its implications in the future.”139 Such justice 
does not pursue judgment or revenge, but reconciliation and peaceful living between the 
companies and the victims of land grabbing. Notwithstanding the difficulty of definitely 
resolving land conflicts, “what about the restitution of land and the honoring of property 
rights in seeking reconciliation?”140 In other words, under which concrete mode can 
justice be done?  
                                                        
138 See République Démocratique du Congo, Loi n°18/001 modifiant et complétant la Loi n° 
007/2002 du 11 juillet 2002 portant Code minier, article 281. 
139 Tony Marshall quoted by Beth Grothe Nielsen, “Repressive, Restorative and Reflexive Law,” 
Victim Policies and Criminal Justice on the Road to Restorative Justice, eds. E. Fattah & S. Parmentier (Leuven: 
Leuven University Press, 2001), 159. 
140 de Gruchy, Reconciliation Restoring Justice, 13. 
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In essence, restorative justice is achieved through alternative modes of dispute 
settlement such as arbitration, conciliation, mediation, and transaction; but the victim 
might not be conceded integral reparation as in court. To put it more precisely, restorative 
justice seeks to “find a way forward with which all parties to the conflict can live. This 
requires a commitment to transformation that extends beyond any one judicial procedure 
or political initiative, recognizing that the level of transformation required for this to 
happen takes time.”141 There should be a way of bringing such commitment to 
transformation and collaboration between companies and communities through 
mediation.  
Nonetheless, private negotiations being central to alternative justice, risks of 
subornation, intimidation, and political influences might happen to restorative 
mechanisms at the expense of local communities. This is not surprising knowing that 
neither restoration nor restitution is likely to be a widespread outcome of negotiations, 
given an attitude of ethical indifference from multinationals.142  
This attitude is displayed, for example, through the grabbing of roughly three 
quarters of the Katanga Province land (South-East Congo) irrespective of the economic 
and social effects of such a redistribution.143 Therefore, how could Katanga become a 
district of agricultural smallholders while, according to the mining mapping, 80% of 
arable lands are mining concessions whose exploitation threatens local communities? 
                                                        
141 Charles Villa-Vicencio, “Transitional Justice, Restoration, and Prosecution,” Dennis Sullivan 
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142 See Byrne, “Business Ethics Should Study Illicit Businesses: To Advance Respect for Human 
Rights,” 499. 
143 See Province du Katanga, Plan quinquennal de développement 2011–2015 (Unpublished), 18. 
 54 
 
To successfully reach restorative justice, I would suggest the scope of “victim-
offender mediation/reconciliation and restitution/compensation”144 as a pragmatic 
approach. Mediation/reconciliation fits culturally with the African Palaver—African 
culture of dialogue for conflict resolution—promoting mutual concessions. While the 
companies should acknowledge unethical practices and allocate a fair compensation to 
the victims, the local communities ought to renounce retaliation.  
Actually, mediation successfully laid out the groundwork for the Ituri Land 
Commission145 handling conflicts between companies and communities following three 
principles. First, mediation/reconciliation is an intervention on the ground, as close as 
possible to the parties—firms and communities, on completion of conciliation attempts.146 
Such a process evidences that the expulsion conflict cannot be settled in one way, given 
the complexity of issues at stake. The resolution mechanisms often combine different 
approaches.  
Meanwhile, mediation/(re)conciliation is a prerequisite for certain disputes in 
court—such as in family or labor conflicts. When mediation/(re)conciliation is deemed 
valuable before hearings, the judge can also require it. Outside of these hypotheses, 
alternative justice should not impose prior conciliation. Thus, this duplication can 
needlessly lengthen the procedure and collapse the economically weakest litigant, local 
communities.  
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Second, mediation must comply with African customs and promote consultation 
at the local level; hence, customary authorities and public debate play an important 
role.147 For Vircoulon and Liégeois, building consensus among companies and 
communities is the purpose of mediation. The custom referred to—the “Barza 
Intercommunautaire”—consists in the gathering of the “cultural leaders of the nine major 
ethnic groups in North Kivu [Eastern Congo] to mediate ethnic-based disputes” and 
others.148 Overall, the Barza Intercommunautaire prevents the breakout of violence in its 
sphere.149   
The recourse to African customs is determinative of conflict resolution because 
they promote ancestral values—dialogue, togetherness, forgiveness, and solidarity—that 
shape African ethics. How compelling could African customs be when they are not 
written, neither do they provide for conflict resolution mechanisms in the contract 
binding companies to the state as we mentioned earlier? In addition, certain African 
customs—for instance, informal tax collection for the customary authority and reference 
to ancestors—are suspicious enough for companies to be wary of customary interference 
in mining-induced conflict resolution. 
Third, Vircoulon and Liégeois believe mediation and court procedures should be 
complementary as the decision from mediation must be given administrative or judicial 
                                                        
147 See ibidem. 
148 Phil Clark, “Transitional Justice after Atrocity,” Routledge Handbook of African Politics, Nic 
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authority150—or exequatur—to be enforceable. This has often been the procedure; but it 
gives the impression of exposing a private consensus to the justice sphere.  
To be explicit, “if justice is, as Howard Zehr says, properly rooted in a concern for 
victims’ needs and offenders’ obligations… and if reparation is the vehicle by which 
offenders meet those obligations, then it follows that reparation would be more effective 
under certain circumstances.”151 With regard to companies and communities, those 
circumstances are marked by a power imbalance between the groups compromising 
effectiveness. Nevertheless, the communities’ narrative of land grab experience—
unfortunately they are not given much space to that end—and the companies’ recognition 
of their wrongdoings lay the ground for restorative justice.  
Moreover, restoration can be achieved under three circumstances: when it is 
tailored to meet the victims’ needs, when its terms and conditions are chosen by those 
most directly involved, and when it is offered rather than ordered.152 Therefore, it should 
not be the companies’ responsibility to predetermine the terms, the momentum, and the 
quantum of restoration for displaced communities as happens in Eastern Congo. Still, the 
communities’ freedom to choose appropriate restoration could also be problematic. The 
search for restorative responses might provoke much constraint over the companies—
financial, material, etc.—which they could not shoulder. 
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It is worth considering the Peruvian mining conflict management strategies.153 Of 
particular note is the advancement of a transformative conflict management capability 
that addresses underlying conditions for conflict, which include righting past wrongs, 
arbitration, and establishing conflict resolution institutions like the Peruvian Oficina 
General de Gestión Social.154  
What finally matters in restorative justice is the type of reparation the victims long 
for. To be effective, the state as public authority should take action, not to punish 
companies but to bring them to a greater sense of solidarity with local communities. 
Hence, restorative justice should shift to what Emile Durkheim terms restitutive justice.  
 
2. Restitutive Justice 
 
 Emile Durkheim’s concept of restitutive justice speaks of solidarity, cooperation, 
and restoration. Unlike the natural impulse for vengeance against companies, “repressive 
justice,” it advocates for justice led by deterrence and is more humane and tolerant.155 
Restitutive justice is, therefore, characterized by reparation or making amends,156 in a way 
that rights the balance upset by the violation.157   
                                                        
153 See Jan Boon, “The Role of Governments in CSR,” Governance Ecosystems: CSR in the Latin 
American Mining Sector, Julia Sagebien & Nicole Marie Lindsay, eds. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2011), 66. CSR here stands for “Corporate Social Responsibility.” 
154 See ibidem. 
155 Charles Quist-Adade, From the Local to the Global: Theories and Key Issues in Global Justice 
(Rotterdam, Boston & Taipei: Sense, 2017), 120. 
156 See Mary K. Stohr & Anthony Walsh, Corrections: The Essentials (Los Angeles, London & New 
Delhi: Sage, 2012), 7. 
157 See Emile Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society (New York: Free Press, 2014), xvii. 
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Reference to deterrence should not be confusing. Deterrence is consistent with the 
opinion that “restitutive responses… offer a balance between calming moral outrage on 
the one hand, and exciting the emotions of empathy and sympathy on the other hand,”158 
two qualities often missing in the companies’ relationship to communities. Indeed, 
empathy and sympathy are constitutive of symbolic reparation designed for stemming 
tumultuous relationships. Under this approach, as Morrison upholds, sanctions are 
oriented toward restitution rather than repression.159 It emphasizes “seeking justice 
through restitution to at least partially compensate a person for a loss.”160  
There is a clear connection, therefore, between restitution and reparation. If 
“restitution typically means the return of wrongly appropriated property…,” then 
compensation suggests “a financial payment that makes up for property that cannot be 
returned or repaired.”161 Arguably, this is what Frontier company endeavored in Sakania 
(South-East Congo), while launching mining exploitation in exchange of which less than 
$ 250 compensation per hectare were granted to over 600 smallholders ousted from their 
farmlands.162 Nonetheless, it would be appropriate to develop a compensation scheme 
nationwide for the loss of income from fishing, farming, and agriculture.163   
According to Johnstone and Van Ness, compensation sets in motion material or 
symbolic reparation. Material reparation offers “something concrete to repair a specific 
                                                        
158 Stohr & Walsh, Corrections: The Essentials, 7. 
159 See Ken Morrison, Marx, Durkheim, Weber: Formations of Modern Social Thought (London, 
Thousand Oaks & New Delhi: Sage, 2006), 174. 
160 Charles H. Powers, Making Sense of Social Theory: A Practical Introduction (Lanham, MD: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 2010), 104. 
161 Sharpe, “The Idea of Reparation,” Handbook of Restorative Justice, 27. 
162 See ACIDH, Mémorandum à Monsieur le Gouverneur du Katanga, 3 
163 See ibid., 4. 
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harm or to compensate for the damage or loss associated with harm. Material reparation 
may reduce the extent of the harm done… This type of reparation often takes the form of 
goods (e.g., the return of stolen property).”164 Land restitution to smallholders is the ideal 
which companies are not prepared for, inasmuch as economic deals remain paramount. 
In addition, those companies are subsidiaries of multinationals supported by the 
Congolese government, sometimes to the detriment of national interests. Therefore, it is 
unwise to coerce them, unless forced by law, to restitute the land.    
Beyond expulsions, the debate on compensation for the Global South, which has 
been impoverished through colonialism or the global economy, remains valid in 
connection with Global North’s immigration policies. Concretely, are “priority rules for 
determining who should be granted entry”165 to a country that caused economic harm to 
another constitutive of symbolic reparation? Without endorsing this assumption, David 
Hollenbach argues that “a rich country that has contributed to causing the economic 
deprivation of a poor country has a special duty to admit economic migrants from that 
poor country.”166 To be ethical, if such were accurate, this approach should not use 
immigration policies, or even development aid, to symbolically perform cheap reparation.   
Apology is often overlooked, yet it is a meaningful form of reparation. For Sharpe, 
“apology is the primary form of reparation, but there are other forms as well.”167 It is a 
question of whether apology is a form of justice. In essence, apology supposes that the 
                                                        
164 Sharpe, “The Idea of Reparation,” Handbook of Restorative Justice, 27. 
165 David Hollenbach, “Migration as a Challenge for Theological Ethics,” Political Theology 12, 2 
(2011), 811. 
166 See ibidem. 
167 Sharpe, “The Idea of Reparation,” Handbook of Restorative Justice, 28. 
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oppressor transcends harm as he or she does not want to stay in constant opposition to 
the victim. Therefore, apology goes beyond the law in order to promote peacebuilding. 
However, what is the moral value of apologies from an institution or corporation, which 
is a legal construction, since the forgivable harm is not considered as a personal and 
burdensome liability of the leader, distinct from the corporation’s liability?   
 
Conclusion 
 
This discussion unveiled the limits of a one-way approach to a multifaceted 
problem, mining-induced conflicts resulting in the involuntary resettlement of 
communities. This complexity is intensified by the Congolese government being both 
judge and party, while arbitrating conflicts provoked by mining concessions it grants to 
multinationals without protective measures for local communities. It would, therefore, be 
pretentious to propose a definite solution.  
There are likewise many unanswered questions requiring further reflection. For 
instance, is mining the foremost reason for expulsions or does it hide complex truths, such 
as the loss of state regulation monopoly in Eastern Congo, the rise of economic 
dictatorship, etc.? Similarly, the violation of property rights by foreign companies raises 
questions such as the meaning of citizenship and ancestral lands for local communities. 
These questions probably disclose the limitations of restorative justice and 
restitutive justice in handling disputes. They certainly appear to broaden the agenda of 
reconciliation theology in order to advance an interdisciplinary approach to forced 
expulsions. Indeed, the merit of alternative justice is to generate emotional appeasement 
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by ensuring speed, confidential, and fraternal arrangements. It enables moral agents to 
safeguard friendship by abstaining from legal proceedings which often compromise the 
bonds. Moreover, alternative justice encompasses a financial advantage as the dispute 
settlement is often free of charge or affordable. It spares the agents from compulsorily 
dependence on lawyers who speak on their behalf. Finally, the quantum of compensation 
is more negotiable than in Court. 
Meanwhile, the evaluation of the resource curse in the DRC has exposed the ethical 
flaws resulting in land grabs. Beyond a commodity boom with the risk of political 
instability and economic volatility (first chapter), it was necessary to look deeply into the 
legal procedure of engagement, which impacts communities and fuels mining-induced 
conflicts. The resolution mechanisms at hand are likely ineffective to guarantee peace and 
reconciliation between mining companies and local communities (second chapter). 
Therefore, the search for ethical foundations more respectful of communities’ rights and 
interests, in the era of extractive industries, is essential to peacebuilding.   
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CHAPTER 3: 
  
WHICH CHRISTIAN ETHICS IN THE ERA  
OF EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES? 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter attempts to map the role of Christian ethics vis-à-vis extractive 
industries. As influential actors in the global economy, extractive industries are “any 
processes that involve the extraction of raw materials from the earth to be used by 
consumers [or] any operations that remove metals, mineral, and aggregates from the 
earth. Examples of extractive processes include oil and gas extraction, mining, dredging 
and quarrying.”168   
Extractive industries in Eastern Congo are alleged to collude in controversial 
practices such as expulsions of communities. According to the World Bank, “the number 
of persons involuntarily displaced and resettled by infrastructural development projects 
during the last 10 years is between 90 and 100 million.”169 It follows, as Pope Francis puts 
it, that “pressure is being put on [communities] to abandon their homelands to make room 
                                                        
168 See www.businessdictionary.com/definition/extractive-industry.html (accessed May 6, 
2018). 
169 Michael M. Cernea & Christopher McDowell, “Reconstructing Resettlers’ and Refugees’ 
Livelihoods,” Risks and Reconstruction: Experiences of Resettlers and Refugees, Michael M. Cernea & 
Christopher McDowell, eds. (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2000), 2. 
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for agricultural or mining projects which are undertaken without regard for the 
degradation of nature and culture.”170  
The encounter with reality creates an ethical demand. In 2008, the International 
Conference of the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) initiative, consistent with the 2009 African 
Mining Vision, adopted six tools to control illegal exploitation of minerals: (1) regional 
certification, especially for coltan; (2) harmonization with national legislations; (3) 
regional database on mineral flows; (4) formalization of supply chain management; (5) 
compliance with the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) for evaluation 
and traceability, and (6) whistle-blowing that aims at reporting wrongdoing. Thus, the 
ICGLR provided a robust approach which, unfortunately, is lacking enforcement, follow-
up, and coercion. 
Following this strategy, the ICGLR ratified the US 2012 Dodd-Franck Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act Section 1502.171 In 2011, US Department of State 
endorsed the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Due 
Diligence.172 The Guidance articulated a five-step framework to address mining which 
fuels conflict in Eastern Congo.173 Accordingly, as Hormats and Otero report, companies 
should: (1) establish strong company management systems; (2) identify and assess risk in 
                                                        
170 Francis, Laudato Sí, (Rome: Vatican Press, 2015), # 146. 
171 Pursuant to this Act, US oil, gas and mining companies registered with the Security Exchange 
Commission to disclose their payments to foreign governments. It specially orders US companies to prove 
that the origin of minerals from DRC or neighboring countries is “free from conflict.”  
172 The OECD “Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from 
Conflict-Affected Areas” provides recommendations to help companies protect human rights and prevent 
mining-induced conflicts. 
173 See Robert D. Hormats & María Otero’s “Statement Concerning Implementation of Section 
1502 of the Dodd-Franck Legislation Concerning Conflict Minerals Due Diligence,” 
https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/168851.pdf (accessed May 3, 2018). 
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the supply chain; (3) design and implement a strategy to respond to identified risks; (4) 
carry out independent third-party audit of supply-chain due diligence at identified points 
in the supply chain; and (5) report on supply-chain due diligence. The slowdown of the 
US commitment to advance these ethical standards—which should prevent 
dislocations—reflects fluctuating African policy by each administration at the White 
House. 
The contextual element was missing in the ICGLR’s approach. Indeed, the 
peculiarity of mining-induced dislocations in the DRC—the only African country with 
the greatest proportion (43.2 million) of baptized Catholics174—rests on their inhumane 
character. Considering the resource curse (first chapter) and the experience of a state 
riddled with mining-induced conflicts (second chapter), the ethical question therefore 
becomes: how can Christian ethics humanize mining-related dislocations?    
It is generally agreed that extractive industries, steeped in the capitalistic 
machinery, create more poor people with new social and economic expectations in the 
Global South. I argue that Christian ethics should engage with what I provisionally call 
the “protological ethics of land.”175 To grasp the meaning of this concept, it suffices to recall 
both philosophical and theological thoughts. 
The philosophical concept of “ethics of a proto-logical atomism” suggests a theory 
of language steeped in the nature of concepts or logical ideas (logical idea-ism),176 a 
                                                        
174 See Holy See Press Office, The Pontifical Yearbook 2017 and the Annuarium Statisticum Ecclesiae 
2015, 170406e (2017), 2. 
175 The Greek word πρῶτος meaning the first, the most important. 
176 See Julius Kovesi, “‘Principia Ethica’ Re-Examined: The Ethics of a Proto-Logical Atomism,” 
Philosophy 59, 228 (1984), 163. 
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thought which departs from our topic. Among theologians, there is a consensus that 
“Christian ethics in light of eschatology would be incomplete without some comments on 
the nature and relation of creation ethics and kingdom ethics. These two are sometimes 
referred to as protological ethics and eschatological ethics, respectively.”177 Bringing an 
African contextual element to this debate, Bénézet Bujo’s “protological foundational act” 
establishes the presence of one’s ancestors and considers the ethical rules drawn up by 
the ancestors.178   
Because the concept protology broadly refers to the origins or God’s initial purpose 
of salvation for humanity, without specific connection with land protection, we prefer to 
overlook these dichotomies and endorse Bénézet Bujo’s position by proposing what I 
undertake to call the “protological ethics of land.” That means a consciousness of the 
important values of preserving land, in the spirit of African traditions and consistent with 
the evolving social context, so that corporations abide by the cultural sensitivities and the 
moral standards drawn up by the ancestors.179  
The “protological ethics of land” is not culturally imperialistic in its principles. It 
hallows cultural values and brings critical claims on three paradigms: the non-
transferability of ancestral land, the recognition of an emerging right to land, and the 
ethics of corporate citizenship as a way of reframing business and society relations.180   
  
                                                        
177 Guenther Haas, “The Significance of Eschatology for Christian Ethics,” Looking into the 
Future: Evangelical Studies in Eschatology, David W. Baker, ed. (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2001), 
335. 
178 Bénézet Bujo, Foundations of an African Ethic: Beyond the Universal Claims of Western Morality 
(New York: Crossroad, 2001), 35. 
179 See ibidem. 
180 See Dirk Matten et al., “Behind the Mask: Revealing the True Face of Corporate Citizenship,” 
Journal of Business Ethics 45, 1/2 (2003), 109. 
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I. Non-Transferability of Ancestral Land 
 
The paradigm of non-transferability of ancestral land is concerned with the 
safeguarding of inheritance, embedded in both biblical ethics and African culture. This 
approach transcends verbatim interpretation of the biblical narrative, goes beyond God’s 
command ethics, and opens doors to the moral responsibility of extractive industries. 
 
A. Biblical Ethics: Naboth’s Vineyard Grab 
 
Biblical ethics patterns a way of engaging with the Bible by applying biblical 
principles and examining biblical narratives in contexts dealing with ethical questions.181 
McQuilkin in no way endorses the mere imposition of ethical systems on biblical texts.182 
Rather, reconstructing biblical narratives from one’s own perspective and experience is a 
redemptive enterprise, because healing begins when one is able to tell his or her story.  
Naboth’s vineyard grab (1 Kgs 21:1-29) “fits the ‘master narrative’ of land 
dispossession that has become dominant in popular historical understanding”183 of 
indigenous communities. This narrative discloses “how the Bible shares visions of mined 
products glorifying God, and how they illustrate attitudes to ownership, land and 
justice.”184 It is a powerful analogy for the dispossession experienced by many African 
                                                        
181 See Robertson McQuilkin & Paul Copan, An Introduction to Biblical Ethics: Walking in the Way 
of Wisdom (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2014), 14. 
182 See ibid., 23. 
183 Michelle Hay, “Buying Naboth’s Vineyard: The Challenges of Land Transfer Under the 1936 
Native Trust and Land Act,” African Studies 71, 3 (2012), 362. 
184 Malcolm Brow et al., “Christian Ethics and Extractive Industries: Theological reflections,” 
Extractive Industries, The Church of England, ed. (London: National Investing Bodies of the Church of 
England and the Ethical Investment Advisory Group, 2017), 21. 
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communities,185 insofar as it “represents Africans as Naboth, who in the Old Testament 
was an ordinary man ploughing land passed down to him by his father. King Ahab, here 
representing [extractive industries], is a powerful figure who covets Naboth’s fertile 
vineyard and wants the land for himself.”186   
In this narrative, what Hay terms “the challenges of ancestral land transfer” brings 
to the fore a fundamental ethical principle regarding extractive industries: ancestral land 
is an “inalienable right.” Baretz acknowledges this right in eloquent terms, “Ahab’s greed 
and Jezebel’s abuse of power are outrageously co-opted to trample the most inalienable 
of rights.”187 The inalienability originates in the Mosaic Law pursuant to which “no 
heritage can pass from one tribe to another, but all the Israelite tribes will retain their own 
ancestral heritage” (Nm 36:9). 
Reporting the discussion to Jezebel, Ahab purposely misquotes Naboth by saying, 
“I will not give my vineyard to you,” and slyly removes the reference to Israelite Law, 
“The Lord forbid that I should give up to you what I have inherited from my fathers” (1 
Kgs 21:3).188 Thus, Christian ethics should go beyond the divine command ethics on land 
ownership (Naboth) to highlight the “moral responsibility” of extractive industries 
(Ahab) as well as their allies (Jezebel) involved in expulsions, inasmuch as “morality 
includes a shared responsibility for evils committed by others from which one may 
oneself profit.”189  
                                                        
185 See Michelle Hay, “Buying Naboth’s Vineyard: The Challenges of Land Transfer Under the 
1936 Native Trust and Land Act,” 362. 
186 See ibidem. 
187 Julie Baretz, The Bible on Location: Off the Beaten Path in Ancient and Modern Israel (Philadelphia: 
Jewish Publication Society, 2015), 224. 
188 See ibid., 227. 
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B. Beyond the Divine Command Ethics 
 
The divine command ethics is only one approach in biblical ethics. As Lúcás Chan 
points out, “contemporary Christian ethicists suggest four separate and yet related tasks 
in using scripture in ethics, namely, the exegetical, hermeneutical, methodological, and 
theological tasks.”190 While it is believed that the Bible is also a source of moral problems, 
scripture provide resources for solving moral issues.191 Yet the turn to scripture alone may 
appear to be a withdrawal from social complexities into individual searching of the 
Scriptures for guidance.192 
My reference to the divine command ethics, relying on Chan’s approach,193 is based 
on two convictions. First, the theme of land grab can be found in Scripture. Second, the 
dimensions of Naboth’s resistance to vineyard grab I have introduced above, motivated 
by his obedience to God— “The Lord forbid that I should give up to you what I have 
inherited from my fathers” (1 Kgs 21:3)—are key points for relating the non-transferability 
of ancestral land and the divine command ethics.  
The divine command ethics—which is often looked upon as the fourteenth 
century’s creation—is committed to the belief that obligations are derived from God’s 
pronouncements so that wrong actions are identical in content with forbidden actions and 
                                                        
190 Lúcás Chan, Biblical Ethics in the 21st Century: Developments, Emerging Consensus, and Future 
Directions (New York and Mahwah, N.J.: Paulist Press, 2013), 30 (emphasis mine). 
191 Ibid., 31. 
192 William C. Spohn, What Are They Saying About Scripture and Ethics? (New York and Mahwah, 
N.J.: Paulist Press, 1995), 21-22. 
193 See Chan, Biblical Ethics in the 21st Century: Developments, Emerging Consensus, and Future 
Directions, 107.  
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obligatory actions equate in content with actions which are commended by God.194 In 
other words, “the class of wrong actions is co-extensive with that of forbidden actions, 
obligatory actions with commanded actions.”195 Therefore, performance of some 
obligations is compatible with divine commands, as long as God is taken to command all 
moral truths.196 However, the role of the judgment of the moral agent remains unclear 
because, as Shaw puts it, the divine command theory holds “simply that obligations 
depend upon [God’s] commands.”197   
The account of Naboth’s vineyard exemplifies, at least in the African context, how 
extractive industries can pervert the relationship between the people and their land,198 as 
an African saying goes, “nothing is more precious on earth than land.” Land embodies 
both the ancestors’ domain and their graves, with most Africans buried on their own land. 
So, it establishes the cosmic union between the living and the dead, and the present and 
past generations. Land also provides human subsistence and advances clan union. 
Donations to missionaries and corporations prevailed in precolonial and colonial Africa 
as a land acquisition system. However, the idea that land can be bought and sold is one 
of the markers in the transition from a pre-modern to a modern African society.199   
Naboth’s experience places the assumptions about the value of ancestral land as 
non-transactable within the cultural context.200 His response, “The Lord forbid that I 
                                                        
194 See Joseph Shaw, “Divine Commands at the Foundations of Morality,” Canadian Journal of 
Philosophy 32, 3 (2002): 419. 
195 See ibid., 420. 
196 See ibidem. 
197 See ibid., 421. 
198 Brow et al., “Christian Ethics and Extractive Industries: Theological reflections,” 27. 
199 See ibidem. 
200 See ibidem. 
 70 
 
should give up to you what I have inherited from my fathers,” displays how cultural 
foundations may clash, while he stands for a different culture in which it might be said 
that the land does not so much belong to us as that we belong to the land.201 To be explicit, 
“in cases of cultural conflict over the way things might be valued and transacted, the text 
suggests that God, at the very least, does not hallow the assumptions of business 
valuation and exchange.”202  
Many biblical laws are shown to have obvious Greek cultural influence, as Gmirkin 
acknowledges, such as the careful legal management of inheritances to guarantee that 
ancestral lands remained within the kinship group or tribe—i.e. the Greek lawmaker, 
Solon (ca. 640—558 B.C.), acknowledged that “equality of land-property” affected to 
greater extent the political community and, for this reason, he introduced such rules as 
maximum-limit in land acquisition or prohibition of selling the family lot203—or the 
Platonic and Aristotelian notion of equal land allotment and land inviolability as a cure 
for poverty.204  
The first claim is that ethicists have to adequately consider the role of cultural values 
or “national cultural dimensions”205 in the global economy. Hence, they can promote 
extractive industries’ obligation to invest in African cultures in a way that facilitates 
mutual adjustment and participation of multinationals in the communities’ integral 
                                                        
201 See ibidem. 
202 Ibidem. 
203 David Asheri, “Laws of Inheritance, Distribution of Land and Political Constitutions in 
Ancient Greece,” Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte 12, 1 (1963), 1. 
204 See Russell E. Gmirkin, Plato and the Creation of the Hebrew Bible (New York: Routledge, 2017), 
145. 
205 See Pramila Rao, “The Role of National Culture on ‘Best’ Practices in India: A Multiple Case 
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development. As an example of mutual adjustment respectful of local cultures, “Chinese 
giant Haier… rather than telling farmers that they should not clean vegetables in washing 
machines because the soil clogs up the machines, they are modifying the product to 
accommodate the [local] need.”206 We are left with the conviction that at the heart of 
extractive industries are the predominating factors of a new technological revolution and 
a cultural crisis precipitated by technologically induced change in the structure of the 
economy.207  
The second claim is that Christian ethics at the crossroads of extractive industries in 
the DRC should elevate the communities’ ethical conduct—which derives from a 
relational network that is anthropocentric, cosmic, and theocentric208—above purely 
material concerns. In this way, indigenous peoples could actively defend ancestral values 
related to land and participate in remedies for expulsions through the African 
Palaver209—the way African communities solve problems through public dialogue.  
The third claim210 relies on the evidence that Christian ethics has to broaden its 
agenda so as to promote the “protological ethics of land” in corporations’ practices 
through advocacy, seminars, publications, preaching, and teaching. 
                                                        
206 Emerald Group Publishing, “Multinationals Must Learn Local Lessons: Policy of ‘One Global 
Strategy’ Is Inadequate for Emerging Markets,” Strategic Direction 28, 10 (2012), 28. 
207 See Robert Fogel quoted by Walter E. Fluker, Ethical Leadership: The Quest for Character, 
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208 See Bénézet Bujo, Foundations of an African Ethic: Beyond the Universal Claims of Western 
Morality (New York: Crossroad, 2001), 3-4. 
209 See ibid., 34-35. 
210 Our first claim was the respect for local cultures in interacting with the global economy; and 
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ancestral values attached to land. 
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Finally, Naboth’s vineyard grabbing does not exhaust the limits of mere legality to 
guarantee morality,211 but reveals how the “transcultural impact of mining must be 
approached with cultural sensitivity and awareness of the Biblical precedents.”212 Yet the 
belief in God’s commands, subject to different interpretations, cannot suffice to support 
non-transferability of ancestral land without considering the eventual moral 
responsibility of extractive industries.  
 
C. Toward Moral Responsibility of Extractive Industries 
 
The ethical obligations of extractive industries have often appeared to be defined 
as corporate social responsibility (CSR), which considers that “in a global economy, 
businesses are often playing a greater role beyond job and wealth creation and CSR is 
business’ contribution to sustainable development. Consequently, corporate behavior 
must not only ensure returns to shareholders, wages to employees, and products and 
services to consumers, but they must respond to societal and environmental concerns and 
values.”213 This concept suggests distributive justice whereby the indigenous people who 
contributed to the success of the company and endured its damaging effects must partake 
in any profit generated by the company. 
 The DRC faces challenges in trying to curb multinationals’ abuses. Such a struggle 
discloses the insoluble limitations of the CSR’s agenda, an absence of extractive industries’ 
                                                        
211 See Malcolm Brow et al., “Christian Ethics and Extractive Industries: Theological reflections,” 
28. 
212 Ibid., 29. 
213 Mary Robinson, “Corporate Social Responsibility in a Global Economy,” Corporate Social 
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vision to improve the country’s socio-economic and environmental order as well as their 
inability to impact the country’s transformation process aimed at eradicating a past 
colonial system of economic exploitation.214 There is reason, therefore, to supplement CSR 
with the principle of moral responsibility. 
With twists and turns, moral responsibility overall “provides the moral 
justification for singling an individual out for condemnation or commendation, praise or 
blame, reward or punishment.”215 This position, as Waller acknowledges, stems from the 
belief that one could have done otherwise or could have exercised greater control over 
his/her action. Nonetheless, “whatever the conditions required for moral responsibility, 
[the action should meet] those conditions that make punishment (and reward, blame, and 
praise) fair and just.”216 In the absence of appropriate standards protecting the indigenous 
people, what makes expulsions blamable in the DRC? 
One may consider consultations with communities, their free, prior, and informed 
consent as well as prior and just compensation being essential conditions for moral 
responsibility. Actually, “the commercial world is full of opportunities to profit legally 
from others’ dodgy practices, and extractive industries are no exception. They may, 
perhaps, be able to move in on a site after unhelpful elements in the population have 
been cowed or removed by factional groups with which the company itself has no link 
whatsoever.”217  
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There exists a complex chain of responsibility which does not make it possible to 
determine the moral agent to blame or punish. Such a complexity, in the time of 
expulsions, points out the significant role which Christian ethics could adopt, establishing 
“the sort of moral responsibility that is desert-entailing (sic), the kind that makes blaming 
and punishing as well as praising and rewarding justified”218 for extractive industries. 
Kenneth Himes relativizes, however, the idea of collective moral responsibility: while 
“the idea of collective causal responsibility is understandable… It is appropriate to seek 
out particular individuals within a group to be held culpable for wrongdoing.”219   
The moral responsibility for expulsions of indigenous people is confused between 
the DRC government and companies. Either the government is held responsible for 
misdeeds committed by mining companies or the latter have to assume their own 
wrongdoing. This “complicity of silent acquiescence in social injustice”220 elucidates the 
connection between expulsions and social sin, which Kenneth Himes characterizes as “ills 
such as racism, sexism, and imperialism which have a systemic quality about them. That 
is, the disvalue involved is embedded in a pattern of societal organization and cultural 
understanding.”221  
                                                        
218 Waller, Against Moral Responsibility, 2. 
219 Kenneth R. Himes, “Social Sin and the Role of the Individual,” The Annual of the Society of 
Christian Ethics 6 (1986), 207. 
220 Peter J. Henriot, “Social Sin: The Recovery of a Christian Tradition,” Method in Ministry: 
Theological Reflection and Christian Ministry, James D. Whitehead & Evelyn Easton Whitehead, eds. (New 
York: Seabury, 1980), 128–29 quoted by Kristin E. Heyer, “Social Sin and Immigration: Good Fences Make 
Bad Neighbors,” Theological Studies 71 (2010), 413-414.  
221 Himes, “Social Sin and the Role of the Individual,” 184. 
 75 
 
In this context, social sin reaches the third and fourth levels222 where unjust 
situations such as expulsions become the new normal, and nothing can be done against 
them, as well as unfair decisions which intensify injustices and dehumanization in society. 
Still, the lack of recognition of the emerging right to land is one of the factors which 
exacerbate dislocations. 
 
II. Recognition of an Emerging Right to Land  
 
 A twofold approach toward striving for indigenous people’s human rights 
consists, on the one hand, in considering expulsions ethically as social aggression and, on 
the other hand, in supporting the emerging right to land as a mechanism for protecting 
the communities’ land.  
 
A. Expulsions as Social Aggression in Catholic Social Teaching 
 
Land grabs exemplify what Pope Francis terms “the rise in new forms of social 
aggression.”223 Addressing this violence, he considers that 
  
it is essential to show special care for indigenous communities and their 
cultural traditions (who) should be the principal dialogue partners, 
                                                        
222 It is important to clarify the four levels of social sin according to Gregory Baum [Gregory 
Baum, Religion and Alienation: A Theological Reading of Sociology (New York: Paulist Press, 1975), 200-202]. 
“First level: social sin is made up of unjust and dehumanizing trends that are built into various societal 
institutions. The destructive trends corrupt the individuals and dehumanize them. Second level: Social sin 
refers to cultural and religious symbols that legitimate and reinforce unjust social institutions. Third level: 
Social sin refers to false consciousness that institutions have created and perpetuated. Fourth level: Social 
sin refers to collective decisions generated by distorted consciousness, which exacerbate injustices in 
society as well as intensify the power of dehumanizing trends.” Eleazar S. Fernandez, Reimagining the 
Human: Theological Anthropology in Response to Systemic Evil (Danvers, MA: Chalice Press, 2004), 66-67. 
223 Francis, Laudato Sí (Rome: Vatican Press, 2015), #46. 
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especially when large projects affecting their land are proposed. For them, 
land is not a commodity but rather a gift from God and from their ancestors 
who rest there, a sacred space with which they need to interact if they are 
to maintain their identity and values. When they remain on their land, they 
themselves care for it best.224 
 
The fourth claim225 is that Christian ethics should trigger an approach to extractive 
industries abiding by the four principles charted in Laudato Sí. First, special care should 
be given to indigenous communities as key private partners. Second, the land is a divine 
gift (Gen. 1:29), not an economic good. This approach leads to “the distinction between 
what should be treated as a given and what ought to be malleable by human endeavor,” 
which “needs to be approached with alertness to the wisdom that resides in religious 
traditions.”226 
Third, the sanctification of ancestral land should be promoted because uprooting 
indigenous communities from their native land disrupts their physical, existential, and 
spiritual relationship with the land; moreover, their special rural life is put at flagrant risk 
of decline and even of extinction.227 Fourth, the indigenous people’s land implies 
stewardship. By virtue of their dwelling on the land, human beings could till and keep it 
best (Gn. 2:15).228 In many ways, there exist no more legitimate custodians of extractive 
industries than local communities. Perhaps this thought motivated the granting of 
                                                        
224 Ibid., # 146. 
225 The first claim pointed out the respect for local cultures in interacting with the global 
economy; and the second claim related to capacity building of communities so that they may actively 
defend their ancestral values attached to land; the third highlighted the promotion of “protological ethics 
of land” in corporations’ practices through advocacy, seminars, publications, preaching, and teaching. 
226 Brow et al., “Christian Ethics and Extractive Industries: Theological reflections,” 29. 
227 Francis, “Address to the Participants in the World Meeting of Popular Movements” (Rome, 
October 28, 2014), #2-3. This speech was published on the Vatican website, www.vatican.va 
228 See ibid., #2.  
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perpetual concessionary tenure on ancestral lands to indigenous communities by the 
Congolese state in the 1970s. 
Pope Francis’ position seems not new. The Post-Synodal Apostolic Exhortation, 
Africae Munus, of Benedict XVI already pointed out “the hidden magnitude of the 
different types of poverty produced by deficiencies in public administration” as the cause 
of “millions of migrants, displaced persons… searching for a homeland and a peaceful 
country in Africa or elsewhere.”229  
Despite the claim that “the Church will continue to make her voice heard and to 
campaign for the defense of all people,” this Exhortation devotes no attention to 
dislocations in Africa as a special category among forced migrations. Likewise, in Laborem 
Exercens, John Paul II mentions “at least a few words” on emigrant workers portrayed as 
“an age-old phenomenon which nevertheless continues to be repeated and is still today 
very widespread.”230  
However, the innovation of Pope Francis is absolutely his special consideration for 
indigenous people as the victims of expulsions while he also proclaims the sacred 
character of ancestral land. It is believed that this conviction originates from his personal 
life as a descendant of immigrants and from his experience as a bishop pastorally close to 
the poor and immigrants. Christian ethics may, therefore, broaden its agenda so as to 
incorporate compassion for communities as well as acceptance of their ancestral values, 
whereas extractive industries attempt to channel a multiculturality that is, in effect, quite 
                                                        
229 Benedict XVI, Africae Munus: Post-Synodal Apostolic Exhortation (Rome: Libreria Editrice 
Vaticana, 2011), #84. 
230 John Paul II, Laborem Exercens (Rome: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1981), #23. 
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aggressive. An expression of compassion consists in promoting the consensus on the 
emerging right to land. 
 
B. Consensus on the Right to Land 
 
Pope Francis considers land, housing, and labor—the Spanish “3T” (tierra, techo, 
trabajo [land, roof, work] well-known by popular movements in Latin America)—as 
sacred rights whose claim is not unusual.231 On the global scale, although the “right to 
land” does not appear in the UNDHR, “the work and the positions taken by the United 
Nations human rights mechanisms all support a formal recognition of this right.”232 Melik 
Özden considers that the 1989 International Labor Organization (ILO) Convention 169 on 
the rights of indigenous and tribal peoples (articles 13 and 17) enshrines the rights of 
indigenous people to their lands and their territories and their right to participate in the 
use, management, and conservation of their resources.233  
Concretely, the ILO (article 17, #2 & 3) highly recommends that “the peoples 
concerned shall be consulted whenever consideration is being given to their capacity to 
alienate their lands or otherwise transmit their rights outside their own community” (#2). 
Likewise, it prevents others “from taking advantage of their customs or of lack of 
understanding of the laws on the part of their members to secure the ownership, 
possession or use of land belonging to them” (#3). To be implementable, the ethical 
standard set by the UN needs social movements to bring the light of Christian ethics into 
                                                        
231 See Pope Francis’ Address to the Participants in the World Meeting of Popular Movements, 2. 
232 Melik Özden, The Right to Land (Genève: CETIM, 2014), 52. 
233 See ibidem. 
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the business world.234 Unfortunately, those partners are often lacking in African rural 
areas where indigenous communities are victims of extractive industries. 
The rise of a “self-standing right,” the right to land, whether it is protected as an 
element of the right to property or whether it is grounded on the special relationship of 
indigenous people to their lands,235 would supplement national regulations for the 
protection of indigenous people against expulsions. The Dutch Cordaid Foundation’s 
2015 Report on the DRC pointed out the asymmetry of the laws governing mining, lands, 
and agriculture as we mentioned in the previous chapter.236  
This lack of proportion facilitates land grabbing by mining companies to the 
detriment of indigenous people constantly forced to uproot.237 The report obviously 
highlights the omnipresence of economic tensions induced by an unharmonious 
enforcement of three conflicting regulations governing the land and its mineral 
substances: land, farming, and mining laws. 
What could be the enforceability of the right to land while communities are still 
facing an attitude of ethical indifference from multinationals?238 This attitude is exhibited 
by the grabbing of roughly three quarters of the Katanga Province land (South-East 
Congo) irrespective of the economic and social effects of such a redistribution.239 
                                                        
234 An unpublished statement made by Professor Kenneth Himes during a doctoral thesis 
defense on March 19, 2018 at Boston College. 
235 See Olivier De Schutter, “The Emerging Human Right to Land,” International Community Law 
Review 12 (2010), 306. 
236 See Cordaid, Exploitation minière au cœur des zones rurales: quel développement pour les 
communautés locales? Rapport (La Haye: Cordaid, 2015), 32. 
237 Ibidem. 
238 See Edmund F. Byrne, “Business Ethics Should Study Illicit Businesses: To Advance Respect 
for Human Rights,” Journal of Business Ethics 103 (2011), 499. 
239 See Province du Katanga, Plan quinquennal de développement 2011–2015 (Unpublished), 18. 
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One may validly question how Katanga could become a district of agricultural 
smallholders while, according to the mining mapping, 80% of arable lands are mining 
concessions whose exploitation threatens indigenous people. Therefore, Christian ethics 
requires the combination of a good governance system and economic management; “both 
structures should place the human development element at the center of progress.”240 
This goal is reachable only if extractive industries can embrace an ethics of corporate 
citizenship. 
 
III. Ethics of Corporate Citizenship 
 
There is internationally a consensus within the legal field that, in addition to: (i) the 
capital contribution, (ii) the commitment over time, and (iii) the risk inherent to the 
pursuit of profit, the fourth and the most significant criterion of a foreign investment is 
its contribution to the development of local communities.241 The debate on this criterion, 
as Matten mentions, interested the legal field only in the 1970s, under the label of 
“corporate social responsibility (CSR).”242   
The four-part model of CSR proposed by Archie Carroll, a professor emeritus of 
management from the University of Georgia, was a pyramid beginning with the economic 
responsibility to be profitable; then the legal responsibility to abide by the laws of the 
                                                        
240 Reginald Moudlin Nalugala, “Extractive Industries and Social Justice in Turkana and Kwale 
Counties of Kenya,” Extractive Industries in Africa: Addressing Conflicts and Integrating Sustaining 
Development, Elias Omondi Opongo, ed. (Nairobi: Paulines Publications Africa, 2018), 113. 
241 See Sébastien Manciaux, Investissements étrangers et arbitrage entre États et ressortissants d’autres 
États: Trente années d’activité́ du CIRDI (Paris: Litec, 2004), 63-72.  
242 Matten et al., “Behind the Mask: Revealing the True Face of Corporate Citizenship,” 109-110. 
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respective society; followed by ethical responsibility which obliges corporations to do 
what is right, just and fair even when business is not compelled to do so by the legal 
framework; and finally, philanthropic responsibility describing activities “desired” by 
society, such as contributing resources to various kinds of social, educational, 
recreational, or cultural purposes.243 This pyramid looks suspicious because it considers 
the ethical and philanthropic responsibilities as a non-binding commitment of extractive 
industries rather than a mandatory component of their business’ responsibility similar to 
the economic and legal responsibilities.244  
Here is a clear sign that extractive industries in general have “never been 
completely happy with the language of business ethics. The underlying inference of both 
the terms ‘business ethics’ and ‘corporate social responsibility’ implies that ‘ethics’ or 
‘responsibility’ are concepts which are not present in business, or even worse, which are 
opposed to business.”245 This opinion, steeped in multinationals’ strategies, can partly 
elucidate their lack of sensitivity to the repercussions of mining-induced dislocations. 
While the same opinion diminishes the effort to moralize business, it also leaves little 
chance to communities to express their social and environmental concerns. 
In the recent decades, critics increasingly belied the concept of CSR, especially 
those who considered that the “terms used by many proponents [were] in the sense of 
reminding business of something additional they should or even must do”246 to be(come) 
ethical. Consequently, “corporate citizenship” has deemed it fitting “to highlight the fact 
                                                        
243 See ibid., 110. 
244 See ibidem. 
245 See ibid., 111. 
246 Ibidem (emphasis in original). 
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that the corporation sees… its rightful place in society, next to other ‘citizens,’ with whom 
the corporation forms a community.”247  
In this approach appears a clear connection between natural person (citizens) and 
corporate person (extractive industries) in terms of rights and responsibilities. While 
extractive industries as citizens are entitled to comfortable rights (protection, profit 
transfer, etc.), they also remain liable for many responsibilities (employment and training 
of the local workforce, tax payment, technology transfer, etc.).  
Therefore, the fifth claim248 is the moralization of business. Christian ethics, 
especially in Africa, should broaden its agenda to spark socially responsible investment 
by engaging extractive industries’ efforts to foster new relationship with communities, 
specifying the rights and responsibilities.  
An example of such corporate engagement is the Jesuit Committee on Investment 
Responsibility (JCIR), which “advocates for corporate behavior consistent with Catholic 
social teaching through dialogues with corporations, shareholder resolutions and proxy 
voting… to expand awareness of socially responsible investment.”249 The JCIR itself 
partners with the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility (ICCR), a faith-based 
organization “calling the world’s most powerful companies to address their impacts on 
                                                        
247 Ibidem. 
248 The first claim pointed out the respect for local cultures in interacting with the global 
economy; and the second claim related to capacity building of communities so that they may actively 
defend their ancestral values attached to land; the third highlighted the promotion of “protological ethics 
of land” in corporations’ practices through advocacy, seminars, publications, preaching, and teaching; the 
fourth claim was an approach to extractive industries abiding by the principles charted in Laudato Sí. 
249 https://www.jesuitseast.org/whatwedo?PAGE=DTN-20140625034611&SUBPAGE=DTN-
20140625034136 (accessed November 15, 2018).  
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the world’s most vulnerable communities.”250 The ICCR members particularly harness 
their collective influence as shareholders in the American Fortune 500 companies to 
improve corporate decision-making on environmental and social issues.251 
In the Congolese context, an ethics of corporate citizenship can be advanced, 
mutatis mutandis, through outreach and research, talking points, development of investor 
guidelines, white papers, benchmarking studies, development of criteria to measure 
company progress, and identification of barriers to the progress of corporate social 
responsibility issues.252 While this approach to moralization of extractive industries might 
seem ambitious, it also creates awareness of untapped strengths of the Catholic Church 
in the DRC likely to exert greater ethical impact on mining companies. 
In 2007, the Congolese Bishops’ Conference (CENCO) established a permanent 
Commission on Natural Resources (Commission Épiscopale pour les Ressources Naturelles, 
CERN), aimed at “proposing alternatives and actions for the management of [natural] 
resources that consider human dignity, respect for human rights, and the environmental 
balance.”253 However, in the DRC, CERN’s action before the decision-makers limits itself 
to advocacy likely to influence laws and policies on natural resources exploitation and 
                                                        
250 https://www.iccr.org/our-approach/what-we-do-how-we-do-it (accessed November 18, 
2018).  
251 See ibidem. 
252 See ibidem. 
253 https://cern-cenco.net/index.php/a-propos-de (accessed November 15, 2018). It is 
mentioned here that in 2010, CERN provided technical support to the Conférence Épiscopale Nationale du 
Congo (CENCO)—United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB) partnership in the adoption of 
the Dodd-Frank Act, which commands US oil, gas, and mining companies registered with the Securities 
and Exchange Commission to disclose their payments to foreign governments. On a special note, it orders 
US companies to prove that the origin of minerals from DRC or neighboring countries is “free from 
conflict.”  
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management, without a targeted effect on the shareholders as well as the multinationals’ 
boards of trustees. 
The final claim,254 consistent with Jesuit praxis, suggests therefore that, in the era of 
extractive industries, ethics voices a renewed commitment to “the creation of a more 
humane business culture, and economic development initiatives with the poor.”255 While 
“the only adequate solution must be a radical one,”256 Pope Francis believes ethicists’ 
commitment should challenge the transnational interests, unconstrained by national laws 
and often abetted by corruption, which frequently exploit the natural resources of the 
poor,257 especially mining-induced dislocated communities. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
This chapter attempted to sketch an agenda for contextualized Christian ethics in 
the era of extractive industries purposely labelled the protological ethics of land, which 
brings critical claims on three paradigms. First, it focuses on the non-transferability of 
ancestral land since, in the biblical perspective, land-dwelling symbolizes the common 
ground of identity and values laid down by the ancestors.  
                                                        
254 First, the respect for local cultures in interacting with the global economy; second, the 
capacity building of communities so that they may actively defend their ancestral values attached to land; 
third, promotion of the “protological ethics of land” in corporations’ practices through advocacy, 
seminars, publications, preaching, and teaching; fourth, an approach to extractive industries abiding by 
the principles charted in Laudato Sí; fifth, the moralization of business through socially responsible 
investment by engaging extractive industries’ efforts to foster new relationship with communities 
focusing on the rights and responsibilities. 
255 Society of Jesus, General Congregation (GC) 35, D.3, #28. 
256 Society of Jesus, 36 GC, D.1, #29. 
257 See Society of Jesus, 35 GC, D.3, #26. 
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Second, the recognition of an emerging right to land—unrecorded in the category of 
social and economic rights or the category of rights to development—is a protection 
mechanism for communities vulnerable to mining-induced displacements.  
Third, the ethics of corporate citizenship brings to the fore the responsibilities of 
extractive industries, corporate agents, to contribute to the development of the host 
country as all moral agents are called to do.   
However, to be complete, the above analysis requires in-depth investigations on 
unanswered questions. For example, how accessible is our ethical language to 
communities as well as business-oriented multinationals? Moreover, it remains 
questionable whether there is room for ethical principles in the business world. These 
questions could, therefore, expand the reflection so as to deepen the ethical debate on 
mining-induced dislocations. 
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GENERAL CONCLUSION 
 
 
It might seem ambitious to entrust to Christian ethics the prerogatives of resolving 
conflicts in society, especially mining-induced dislocations, while mining companies 
operating in the DRC have often overlooked ethical concerns. Dealing with the initial 
question, “how can ethics humanize involuntary displacement and resettlement of 
communities in making way for natural resources extraction?” this research needed 
primarily to outline the problem, in the DRC context of instability, and scrutinize 
theories—the resource curse, the extractive industries influence, kleptocracy, and the 
capabilities—that pave the way for evictions or explain mining-induced dislocations. 
It is believed that China invests USD300 billion in trade with Africa, ten times more 
than the United States, with a noteworthy presence of Asian multinationals involved in 
mining in Eastern Congo. Yet dislocations of communities are not only caused by conflicts 
around the mines. They are essentially fueled by inequitable legal procedures of 
engagement with the concerned communities.  
Hence, the reform of the legal framework to recognize property rights to 
communities over their ancestral lands should be part of the solution. Dislocations and 
illicit mineral exploitations being channeled by persistent armed conflicts, and a lack of 
political will to overcome allegedly 120 armed groups active in Eastern Congo remain 
suspicious. In many ways, this situation leads to a conjecture that some government 
 87 
 
officials presumably benefit from conflict minerals and exacerbate dislocations to 
appropriate natural resources. 
This discussion brings to the fore the question: “how to create just and equitable 
conditions for reconciliation between mining companies and the dislocated 
communities?” We perceive the limits of a one-way approach to this multifaceted 
problem resulting in the involuntary resettlement of communities. Such a complexity is 
intensified by the government being, apparently, judge and jury in arbitrating conflicts 
induced by mining concessions, which benefited multinationals without protective 
decisions for local communities. It would, therefore, be pretentious to propose any 
definite solution without politics being involved.   
Many unanswered questions requiring further reflection remain valid. For 
example, is mining the foremost reason for dislocations or does it hide complex truths, 
such as the loss of a state regulation monopoly in Eastern Congo, the rise of an 
international economic dictatorship, etc.? The violation of the communities’ right to land 
by foreign companies raises embarrassing questions such as the meaning of citizenship 
and the ownership of ancestral lands for local communities. These questions reveal the 
limitations of restorative justice and restitutive justice in handling land disputes. 
Moreover, they appear to broaden the agenda of reconciliation theology so as to advance 
an interdisciplinary approach to forced mining-induced dislocations.  
Meanwhile, the evaluation of the resource curse in the DRC has exposed the ethical 
flaws resulting in land grabs. Beyond a commodity boom with the risk of political 
instability and economic volatility, there is need to look deeply into the legal framework 
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which impacts communities and fuels mining-induced conflicts. The resolution 
mechanisms at hand are likely inefficient to guarantee peace and reconciliation between 
mining companies and local communities. Thus, the search for ethical foundations more 
respectful of the communities’ rights and interests is crucial to peacebuilding in the DRC 
which is so riddled with mining-induced conflicts. 
Considering this reality, the ultimate search focuses on the role of Christian ethics 
in humanizing mining-induced dislocations. We sketched an agenda for contextualized 
Christian ethics in the era of extractive industries labelled the “protological ethics of 
land,” which brings critical claims on three paradigms.   
First, the non-transferability of ancestral land since, from the biblical ethics 
perspective, land-dwelling symbolizes God’s promise, the common ground of identity 
and values laid down by the forefathers. Second, the recognition of an emerging right to 
land—unrecorded in the bloc of social and economic rights or the category of rights to 
development—as a protection mechanism for vulnerable communities. Third, the ethics 
of corporate citizenship highlights the responsibilities of extractive industries, corporate 
agents, to contribute to the development of the host country with its multiple moral 
agents.   
Therefore, for Christian ethics in the era of extractive industries, this research 
advances five claims (or recommendations) derived from the above paradigms. First, 
ethicists have to adequately consider the importance of cultural values in interacting with 
the global economy. Second, Christian ethics at the crossroads of extractive industries in 
the DRC should elevate the communities’ ethical discourse and conduct above merely 
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material concerns. In this way, indigenous peoples could actively defend their ancestral 
values attached to land and participate in remedies to expulsions.   
Third, Christian ethics should broaden its agenda so as to promote the 
“protological ethics of land” in corporations’ practices through advocacy, seminars, 
publications, preaching, and teaching.  
Fourth, Christian ethics should trigger an approach to extractive industries abiding 
by the four principles charted in Laudato Sí: special care to indigenous communities; the 
land as a divine gift (Gen 1:29), not an economic good; the sanctification of ancestral land 
because uprooting indigenous communities from their native land disrupts their physical, 
existential, and spiritual relationship with the land, their special rural life being put at 
flagrant risk of decline and even extinction; and the indigenous people’s land 
stewardship.  
Fifth, the moralization of business, especially in Africa, by broadening Christian 
ethics’ agenda to spark socially responsible investments, which engage the extractive 
industries in new relationships with communities focusing on rights and responsibilities. 
This effort is strengthened by the establishment of a “Christian Social Movement against 
Mining-Induced Dislocations.”   
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